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Aggregate  Implications  of Credit 
Market  Imperfections 
Kiminori  Matsuyama,  Northwestern  University 
"All happy  families  resemble  one  another.  Each  unhappy  family  is unhappy  in 
its  own  way/' 
Leo  Tolstoy,  Anna  Karenina 
1  Introduction 
It  is widely  recognized  that  the market  economy  fails  to  allocate  the 
credit  to  the most  productive  investment  projects  because  credit  trans 
actions  are  subject  to  agency  problems.  In  the  presence  of  such  imper 
fections,  the  borrower's  net  worth?also  known  as  the  balance  sheet 
condition?plays  crucial  roles  in  allocating  the  credit  across  entrepre 
neurs,  firms,  industries,  and  nations.  A  change  in  the  aggregate  level  of 
wealth  and  a  change  in  the  distribution  of wealth  thus  affect  the  equi 
librium  allocation  of  the  credit  and  hence  patterns  of  investments.  Fur 
thermore,  the  resulting  change  in  the  investments  causes  a  further 
change  in  the  level  and  distribution  of wealth,  which  leads  to  a  further 
change  in  the  equilibrium  patterns  of  investments. 
Stimulated  in part  by  the  advances  made  in  the microeconomics  of  fi 
nancial  markets  and  corporate  finance  over  the  last 30 years,  the problems 
of  credit  market  imperfections  have  recently  found  many  applications  in 
business  cycles,  growth  and  development,  and  international  economics. 
However,  this  progress  has  left  in  its wake  a bewildering  array  of  indi 
vidual  models  with  seemingly  conflicting  results.  For  example,  do  the  im 
perfections  add  persistence  to  the macroeconomic  dynamics,  as  sug 
gested  by  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1989),  Kiyotaki  and Moore  (1997),  and 
others?  Or,  do  they  add  volatility,  as  suggested  by  Azariadis  and  Smith 
(1998), Aghion  and  Banerjee  (2005),  and Matsuyama  (2004b)?  If they  are 2  Matsuyama 
responsible  for  causing  fluctuations,  is  it because  the misallocation  of 
credit  creates  recessions  or because  it creates  boom-and-bust  cycles?  Does 
improving  credit  markets  make  fluctuations  more  or  less  volatile?  Does 
financial  globalization  alleviate  or  exacerbate  the  credit market  imperfec 
tions? Do  credit  transactions  between  the  rich  and  the poor  help  to reduce 
or magnify  the  inequality  among  households? 
This  paper  comes  out  of my  conviction  that  credit  market  imperfec 
tions  offer  the  key  to understanding  a wide  range  of  important  issues. 
Yet,  aggregate  implications  of  credit  market  imperfections  are  so  rich 
and  diverse  that  one  should  not  expect  to  find  a  simple  answer  of  any  of 
the  above  "either-or"  questions.  It should  come  as no  surprise  that  they 
are  so  rich  and  diverse  because  they  depend  on  the manner  in  which  dif 
ferent  agents  and/or  different  investments  interact  with  each  other, 
which  consequently  affects  amplification  and  propagation  mechanisms. 
This  suggests  that  the  intuition  gained  from  studying  a particular  fam 
ily of models  can be misleading  because  the  results  may  be  driven  by  the 
specific  assumptions  made  about  the  set  of  agents  and  investment  proj 
ects  that  are  competing  for  credit. 
This  paper  offers  a  road  map  for  understanding  aggregate  implica 
tions  of  credit  market  imperfections.  By  bringing  together  a diverse  set 
of  results  (many  existing  and  some  new)  within  a unified  framework,  it 
aims  to  draw  a  coherent  picture 
so  that  one  is  able  to  see  some  close  con 
nections  between  seemingly  conflicting  results  across  many  topics  that 
are  ordinarily  treated  separately  or  even  sometimes  viewed  as  unre 
lated.1  To  this  end,  I  first  develop  a  simple,  highly  abstract  model  of 
credit  market  imperfections,  which  is meant  to  capture  all  sorts  of 
agency  problems  that  affect  credit  transactions.  Using  this  single  model 
throughout,  I examine  the  effects  of  credit  market  imperfections  in  se 
ries  of  relatively  simple  equilibrium  models.  The  discussion  will  be  or 
ganized  by  the manners  in which  different  models  "close  the  system"; 
that  is, based  on  the  assumptions  about  the  sets  of  agents  and  of  proj 
ects  competing  for  the  credit  and  about  the  price  effects  of  different  in 
vestment  projects,  which  determine  the  amplification  and  propagation 
mechanisms  in  these  models.  It  will  be  shown  how  a wide  range  of  ag 
gregate  phenomena  may  be  attributed  to  the  common  cause.  They  in 
clude,  among  other  things,  endogenous  investment-specific  technical 
changes,2  development  traps,  leapfrogging,  persistence  of  inefficient  re 
cessions,  recurrent  boom-and-bust  cycles, 
reverse  international  capital 
flows,  the  rise  and  fall  of  inequality  across  nations,  and  the  patterns  of 
international  trade.  The  framework  is  also  used  to  investigate  some Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  3 
equilibrium  and  distributional  impacts  of  improving  the  efficiency  of 
credit  markets. 
One  recurring  finding  is  that  the  properties  of  equilibrium  often  re 
spond  non-monotonically  to  parameter  changes.  For  example,  increas 
ing borrower's  net worth  first  leads  to a higher  equilibrium  rate  of  return 
and  then  to a  lower  equilibrium  rate  of  return;  improving  credit  market 
first  leads  to  increased  volatility  and  then  to  reduced  volatility;  produc 
tivity  improvements  first  lead  to greater  inequality  and  then  to  reduced 
inequality.  Such  non-monotonicity  suggests  some  cautions  for  studying 
their  effects  within  a narrow  class  or  a particular  family  of models.  For 
example,  in  their  attempts  to understand  the  effects  of  credit  market  im 
perfections,  many  authors  study  models  with  no  credit  market.  Yet, 
there  is no  reason  to believe  that  the  effects  of  an  imperfect  credit  mar 
ket  are  similar  to  those  of  no  credit  market.  In  their  attempts  to under 
stand  the  effects  of  improving  the  credit  market,  many  authors  compare 
models  with  credit  market  imperfections  and  models  with  the  perfect 
credit  market.  Yet,  there  is no  reason  to believe  the  effects  of  (partially) 
improving  credit  markets  are  similar  to  those  of  eliminating  credit  mar 
ket  imperfections  completely.3 
2  A  Simple  Model  of  Credit  Market  Imperfections: 
A  Single  Agent's  Perspective 
Let  us  start with  a simple  and  highly  abstract  model  of  credit  market  im 
perfections,  which  will  be  used  as  a building  block  in all  the  equilibrium 
models  discussed  below.  Here,  we  will  look  at  the  problem  faced  by  a 
single  agent  (an  entrepreneur  or  a  firm)  in  isolation,  taking  its environ 
ment  as  exogenous. 
The world  lasts  for  two  periods:  0 and  1. The  agent  is endowed  with  o> 
<  1 units  of  the  input  in period  0 and  consumes  only  in period  1. There 
are  two  ways  of  converting  the  period-0  input  into  the  period-1  con 
sumption.  First,  the  agent  can  run  a non-divisible  investment  project, 
which  converts  one  unit  of  the  input  in period  0  into  R  units  in  con 
sumption  in period  1 by  borrowing  1 -  a>  at  the  gross  market  rate  of  re 
turn  equal  to  r. Second,  the  agent  can  lend  x <w  units  of  the  input  in pe 
riod  0  for  rx units  of  consumption  in period  1. 
The  agent's  objective  is  to maximize  the  period-1  consumption.  By 
borrowing  1 -  co to run  the project,  the  agent  could  produce  R units  of  the 
consumption  good,  from which  r(l 
- 
co)  units  need  to be  repaid,  so  that 
the period-1  consumption  (and  the utility)  would  be  equal  to U  =  R  - 
r(l 4  Matsuyama 
- 
co) 
=  R -  r +  rco.  This  is greater  than  or  equal  to U  =  rco, the  amount  that 
the  agent  could  consume  by  lending  at  the  gross  market  rate  r,  if and 
only  if 
R  >  r.  (PC)(1) 
Thus,  the project  return  needs  to be  higher  than  (or equal  to)  the  oppor 
tunity  cost  of  running  the  project  in order  to make  the  agent  eager  (or 
willing)  to borrow  and  invest.  This  constraint  (as well  as  the  analogous 
constraints  in  all  the models  developed  later)  shall  be  called  (PC)  for 
Profitability  Constraint. 
Even  when  (PC) holds  with  strict  inequality  and  hence  the  agent  is ea 
ger  to  invest,  credit  market  imperfections  might  keep  the  agent  from 
investing.  To  obtain  credit,  the  agent  must  somehow  generate  to  the 
lenders  the  rate  of  return,  r,  which  is determined  by  the market.  How 
ever,  for  a variety  of reasons,  the  entire  project  output,  R, may  not  be  used 
for  the  purpose.  To  capture  this  in  the  simplest  manner,  it  is assumed 
that no more  than  a  fraction,  X, of  the project  revenue  can  be  pledged  to 
the  lenders  for  the  repayment.  Thus,  the  agent  can  generate  the  rate  of 
return  required  by  the  lenders,  if and  only  if 
XR  >  r(l 
- 
co).  (BC)(2) 
Only  when  this  constraint  is  met,  the  agent  is capable  of  borrowing  and 
investing.  This  constraint  (as  well  as  the  analogous  constraints  in all  the 
models  developed  later)  shall  be  called  (BC)  for  Borrowing  Constraint.4 
Another  way  of  looking  at  this  constraint  is b =  1 -  co  <XR/r,  which  is to 
say  that  that borrowing  is  limited  by  the present  discounted  value  of  the 
pledgeable  revenue  of  the  project,  XR/r.  This  constraint  can  also  be 
rewritten  as  co  >1  - 
XR/r,  which  states  that  a  sufficiently  high  net  worth 
would  overcome  the  credit  market  imperfection.5 
For  the  investment  to  take  place,  the  agent  must  be  both  willing  and 
capable  to borrow,  that  is, only  when  both  (PC)  and  (BC)  are  satisfied. 
Which  of  the  two  is a  relevant  constraint  depends  on  X +  co. If X +  co  > 
1,  (PC)  is  more  stringent  than  (BC). That  is,  the  agent  can  borrow  when 
ever  he wants  to borrow.  In  this  case,  credit  market  imperfections  do  not 
affect  the  investment  decision.  If X +  co  <  1, on  the  other  hand,  (BC)  is 
more  stringent  than  (PC). That  is, credit  market  imperfections  may  affect 
investment.  Indeed,  if 1 <R/r  <  (1 
- 
co)  A,  (PC) holds  but  (BC) does  not, 
meaning  that  the  agent  cannot  initiate  the profitable  investment  project 
due  to  the borrowing  constraint. 
In  this  simple,  highly  abstract  model  of  credit  market  imperfections, Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  5 
the pledgeability,  X,  is  meant  to capture  all  sorts  of  agency  problems  that 
restrict  the  agent's  ability  to  finance  the profitable  investment  externally. 
The  severity  of  these  agency  problems  could  depend  on  the project,  the 
industry,  or  the  institutional  factors  that  determine  the  general  effi 
ciency  of  credit  markets,  such  as  the  quality  of  legal  or  contractual  en 
forcement,  corporate  governance,  or more  broadly  the  state  of  financial 
development  of  the  economy.  For  this  reason,  I will  later  allow  the 
pledgeability  parameter,  X,  to vary  across  projects,  across  industries,  or 
across  countries  in  equilibrium  models  with  many  projects,  many  in 
dustries,  or  many  countries. 
In  this  simple,  highly  abstract  model  of  credit  market  imperfections, 
the  input  endowment,  co, is meant  to  capture  the  entrepreneur's  net 
worth,  the  firm's  balance  sheet  condition,  or, more  broadly,  the  bor 
rower's  credit-worthiness.  For  this  reason,  I will  later  allow  the  net 
worth  parameter,  co, to vary  across  agents  in  equilibrium  models  with 
heterogeneous  agents.  It  will  also  be  allowed  to depend  on  the  past  in 
vestment  when  considering  the  dynamic  implications  of  credit  market 
imperfections. 
Remark  1: The  microeconomics  of  credit  markets  offers  many  different 
agency  stories  that  could  be  used  to  justify  the  assumption  that  the bor 
rowers  cannot  fully  pledge  the  project  revenue.6  The  simplest  story 
would  be  that  they  strategically  default,  whenever  the  repayment  obli 
gation  exceeds  the  default  cost.  Alternatively,  each  project  is  specific  to 
the  agent  and  requires  his  services  to generate  the maximum  revenue. 
Without  the  services,  the  revenue  would  be  reduced.  Then  the borrower, 
by  threatening  to  withdraw  his  services,  can  renegotiate  the  repayment; 
see Hart  and Moore  (1994),  Hart  (1995),  and  Kiyotaki  and Moore  (1997). 
There  is also  the  costly-state-verification  approach  of  Townsend  (1979), 
used  by  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1989),  Boyd  and  Smith  (1997),  and  oth 
ers.  See  also  the moral  hazard  approach  used  by Holmstrom  and  Tirole 
(1997,1998)  and  others.  A  large  number  of  studies  are  devoted  to  the  is 
sues  of  the  relative  merit  (conceptual  and/or  empirical)  of  different 
agency  stories;  see,  for  example,  Hart  (1995,  ch.  5,  appendix)  and 
Paulsen,  Townsend,  and  Karaivanov  (2006).  In  this  paper,  however,  I 
will  not  be  concerned  with  the  question  of  which  stories  offer  most 
plausible  or  compelling  explanations  for  the microeconomic  causes  of 
credit  market  imperfections.  Instead,  I  will  simply  treat  credit  market 
imperfections  as  a  fact  of  life,  and  proceed  with  investigating  their  ag 
gregate  or  equilibrium  consequences,  using  the  highly  abstract,  reduced 6  Matsuyama 
form  approach,  which  is  meant  to  encompass  all  sorts  of  agency  prob 
lems  discussed  in  the microeconomic  literature.7 
Remark  2: The  careful  reader  must  have  undoubtedly  noticed  that  I de 
liberately  avoid  the  use  of  the  terms  such  as  "debt  capacity,"  "interest 
rate,"  and  "loan  market,"  and  instead  use 
"borrowing  constraint,"  "rate 
of  return,"  and  "credit  market."  This  is because  this  paper  is concerned 
with  aggregate  implications  of  credit  market  imperfections,  arising 
from  broad  external  financing  difficulties.  Note  that  the borrowing  con 
straint  arises  due  to  the  inability  of  the  borrowers  to pledge  the  entire 
project  revenue  to generate  the  higher  rate  for  the  lenders,  not  because 
of  any  arbitrary  restriction  on  the menus  of  the  financial  claims  that  they 
can  issue.  The  main  issues  addressed  here  are  general  enough  that  they 
are  independent  of  the  financial  structure.  Indeed,  the model  is  too  ab 
stract  to  make  a  meaningful  distinction  between  the  equity,  the debt,  the 
bonds,  or  any  other  forms  of  financial  claims,  which  should  be  viewed 
as  an  advantage  of  the model.8 
3  Partial  Equilibrium  Models 
We  have  so  far  looked  at  only  the  single  agent's  problem  in  isolation, 
holding  all  the  prices  as  exogenous,  and  without  worrying  about  inter 
actions  among  agents.  Let  us  now  start  letting  many  agents  interact 
through  equilibrium  prices. 
3.1  Homogeneous  Agents:  The Net  Worth  (Balance  Sheet)  Effect 
Let  us  now  consider  a continuum  of homogenous  agents  with  unit  mass. 
As  before,  each  agent  is endowed  with  co  <  1 units  of  the  input  at period 
0  and  consumes  only  at  period  1.  In  addition  to  the  presence  of many 
agents,  the key  difference  is that  the projects  run by  the  agents  convert  the 
input  into  capital.  Capital  is then  used  to produce  the  consumption  good 
in period  1,  with  the  constant  returns  to  scale  (CRS)  technology,  F(k, Q, 
where  k  is  the  total  supply  of  capital  (which  will  be  determined  in equi 
librium),  and  ?  is a vector  of  "the  hidden  factors"  in  fixed  supply.  Let/(fc) 
= 
F(k, Q,  which  satisfies/'  >  0 >/"  and/'(0) 
=  ?>.  The  competitive  factor 
markets  reward  each  unit  of  capital  by/'(fc)  and  the  residual,/(fc) 
- 
kf'(k) 
>  0, goes  to  the  owners  of  the  "hidden  factors"  in  fixed  supply.9 
The  agents  have  two  means  of  converting  the  input  endowments 
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project,  which  converts  one  unit  of  the  input  in period  0  into  R  units  of 
capital  in period  1 by  borrowing  1 -  co  at  the market  rate,  r,  which  con 
tinues  to be  treated  as  exogenous.10  Since  each  unit  of  capital  earns/'(A:) 
in consumption,  each  project  generates  Rf'{k)  units  of  the  consumption 
good.  Second,  each  agent  can  lend  the  input  endowment  in period  0 at 
the  rate  of  return  equal  to  r, as before.  Finally,  the  total  supply  of  capi 
tal  is given  by  k = 
Rn,  where  n  is  the  number  (or  the  fraction)  of  the 
agents  who  borrow  and  invest.  Both  n  and  k =  Rn  are  determined  in 
equilibrium. 





co).  By  lending  at  the market  rate,  r, the  agent  can  consume 
U  =  rco. By  comparing  the  two,  (PC) now  becomes 
Rf'(k) 
>  r.  (PC)(3) 
On  the  other  hand,  (BC)  is now  given  by 
XRf'(k)>r(l-(o).  (BC)(4) 
Note  that  the  two  constraints  in  this model,  (3) and  (4), differ  from  those 
in the  single  agent's  problem,  (1) and  (2), only  in that  the project  revenue, 
R,  is now  replaced  by  Rf'(k),  and  hence  become  endogenous. 
In  equilibrium  the  investment  takes  place  until  one  of  the  (BC)  and 
(PC) becomes  binding,  so  that 
Rf'(k)  =  Max  1, 
-^^ 
\r  (PC)  +  (BC)(5) 
This  determines  the  equilibrium  value  of  fc.11  When  X +  co  <  1,  (5) be 
comes 
Rf\k) = 
(~^-\r>r.  (6) 
Thus,  (BC)  is binding  but  (PC)  is not;  the project  return  is strictly  higher 
than  the  opportunity  cost  of  the  project.  All  the  agents  are  eager  to  in 
vest,  but  no more  agents  can  borrow  and  invest,  because  that would  vi 
olate  (BC).  In short,  there  is  too  little  investment.  In  this  case,  improving 
the  credit  market,  an  increase  in X,  obviously  leads  to  a higher  invest 
ment.  A  higher  co  also  leads  to a higher  investment.  This  is  the net worth 
(or balance  sheet)  effect. As  the borrower  net  worth  improves,  the  agents 
need  to borrow  less, which  eases  the  borrowing  constraint,  and  hence 
more  investment  will  be  financed.  When  X +  co  >  1, on  the  other  hand, 
(5) becomes 8  Matsuyama 
Rf\k)  = 
r>(^^y 
(7) 
Thus,  (PC)  is binding  and  the  level  of  investment  is optimal.  In  this  case, 
there  is no  net  worth  effect;  a higher  co  would  not  affect  the  investment. 
Remark  3:  In  this model,  only  the  fraction  n of  the  agents  invests  in equi 
librium,  which  means  that  the  fraction  1 -  n of  them  becomes  the  lenders. 
This  obviously  raises  the question,  "How  can  the  credit  be  allocated  only 
to a  fraction  of  homogeneous  agents?"  When  X +  co  >  1,  this  is not  a prob 
lem,  because  (PC)  is binding;  Rf'{k) 
=  r. Thus,  the  agents  are  indifferent 
between  borrowing  and  lending.  However,  when  X +  co  <  1,  (PC)  is not 
binding,  Rf'{k)  >  r, so  that  the  agents  strictly  prefer  borrowing  to  lend 
ing.  There  are  two  possible  resolutions  for  this.  First,  we  may  think  that 
the  equilibrium  allocation  necessarily  involves  credit  rationing  in  this 
case.  The  credit  is allocated  randomly  to the  fraction  n of  the  agents,  while 
the  rest  of  the  agents  are  denied  credit.12  The  latter  have  no  choice  but  to 
become  the  lenders;  they would  not  be  able  to entice  others  to switch  and 
become  lenders  by  promising  a higher  return  because  that would  violate 
(BC).  Second,  we  may  view  the  homogeneous  agent  model  as  the  limit 
case  of  some  heterogeneous  agent  models.  For  example,  the  agents  may 
differ  in their  endowment,  distributed  according  to G(co).  Then,  the  equi 
librium  is given  by  the  threshold  level  of  the  endowment,  coc, such  that 
the  agents  whose  endowments  are  lower  (higher)  than  coc  become  the 
lenders  (borrowers).  Indeed,  we  will  shortly  look  at  such  a model  with 
heterogeneous  endowments.  The  above  model  may  be  obtained  as  the 
limit when  G(co)  converges  to a  single  mass  point. 
Remark  4:  Just  in  case  one  might  suspect  that  the  results  here  may  be 
driven  by  the  indivisibility  of  the  projects,  not  by  credit  market  imper 
fections,  the  role  of  the  indivisibility  assumption  here  is  more  subtle  than 
one  might  think.  In  the  literature,  it  is often  argued  that  the  equilibrium 
analysis  of  credit  market  imperfections  is  fundamentally  difficult  be 
cause  it  is necessary  to model  heterogeneous  agents  in  order  for  credit 
market  transactions  to  take  place.  This  is not  true;  credit  market  transac 
tions  can  take  place  even  among  homogeneous  agents  if there  are  some 
indivisibility  constraints.  In what  follows,  I find  it useful  to  assume  the 
homogeneous  agents  within  each  economy  when  exploring  the  effects  of 
heterogeneity  across  projects  or  heterogeneity  across  countries.  The  in 
divisibility  is assumed  only  to keep  the  credit  market  active  even  among Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  9 
the homogeneous  agents.  To  ensure  that  the  results  are not  driven  by  the 
indivisibility  of  the projects  per  se,  it is assumed  that  a continuum  of  the 
agents  have  access  to  the  identical  (indivisible)  projects.  This  helps  to 
convexify  the  aggregate  production  technologies.  Having  said  this, how 
ever,  let us  now  look  at  some  examples  with  heterogeneous  agents. 
3.2  Heterogeneous  Agents:  Distributional  Implications 
Let  us  first  allow  the  agents  to differ  in  the  input  endowment,  or  the net 
worth,  where  co is distributed  according  to G(co).  Otherwise,  the model 
is  the  same  as  above.  In particular,  the  agents  share  the  same  R,  that  is, 
they  are  equally  productive  as  entrepreneurs. 
With  heterogeneous  endowments,  different  agents  face  different 
(BC).  For  a given  level  of  k, only  those  with  co  > 
coc 
=  1 - 
XRf'(k)/r,  can 
borrow.  If (PC) holds  strictly,  Rf'(k)  >  r, all  of  these  agents  invest.  Hence, 
the  total  supply  of  capital  is equal  to R  times  the  fraction  of  the  agents 
satisfying  (BC),  so  that 
T  /  XRf'(k)Y  k = R  1 -  Gil-LX1  .  (8) 
As  the RHS  of  (8)  is decreasing  in k, this  equation  determines  k uniquely. 
As  long  as Rf'(k)  >  r holds  at  this  solution,  it  is  indeed  the  equilibrium 
value  of  k.  If not,  the  equilibrium  is given  by  Rf'(k) 
=  r. In  what  follows, 
let us  assume  that  the  parameters  are  such  that  the  equilibrium  is char 
acterized  by  (8)  with  Rf'(k)  >  r. 
Both  a  lower  r and  a higher  X  increase  the RHS  for  a given  k. Hence, 
both  lead  to a higher  k. The  reason  is simple.  These  changes  increase  the 
present  discounted  value  of  the  pledgeable  revenue,  which  raises  the 
borrowing  limit.  Hence,  more  agents  can  finance  the  project.  One  can 
also  show  that  k goes  up,  when  the distribution  of  the net worth  shifts  to 
the  right  in  the  First-Order-Stochastic-Dominant  manner.  This  is a gen 
eralized  version  of  the net  worth  effect  discussed  earlier. 
Let  us  now  see  the distributional  implications  of  improving  the  credit 
market.  Let  X go  up  from  X~ and  X+.  (Superscript 
"-"  denotes  the  value 




denotes  the  value  after 
the  change.)  As  noted  above,  an  increase  in X  leads  to  an  increase  in k 
from  k~  to  k+.  This  increase  in  k  occurs  because  a  larger  fraction  of 
the  agents  are  now  able  to  finance  their  projects,  which  means  that  the 
threshold  level  of  the net worth  has  declined  from  co; 
=  1 -  X Rf'{k~)/r  to 
coc+ 
=  1 -  X+ Rf'(k+)/r.  Therefore,  we  need  to distinguish  three  classes  of 10 
Matsuyama 
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Figure  1.1 
Distributional  Impacts 
agents.  First,  those  with  co <  co/  invest  neither  before  nor  after  the 
change.  Hence,  their  utility  (period-1  consumption)  before  and  after  the 
change  are  given  by  U~(co) 
= 
(i+(co) 
=  rco. Second,  those  with  co/ <  co  < 
co~ invest  only  after  the  change.  Hence,  their  utility  increases  from  U~(co) 






co).  Finally,  those  with  co  >  co~  invest  both 












co),  before/'(fc)  declines  from 
f'(k~)  to/'(/c+).  Figure  1.1  illustrates  these  welfare  effects.13 
Thus,  not  everyone  gains  from  the  credit  market  improvement.  The 
middle  class  gains  (as  well  as  the  owner  of  the hidden  factors,  which  are 
complementary  inputs  to  capital  in  the  production  of  the  consumption 
good),  while  the  rich  lose.  The  reason  is  that  credit  market  imperfections 
operate  like  entry  barriers.  The  political  economy  implications  should  be 
clear.  If the political  power  is in  the hands  of  the  rich who  have  easy  access 
to credit,  the government  has  an  incentive  not  to  improve  the credit market. 
33  Heterogeneous  Agents:  Replacement  Effects 
Let  us  now  consider  the  case  where  the  agents  differ  also  in  their  pro 
ductivity.  More  specifically,  each  agent  is  identified  by  (co,  R)  distributed 
according  to G(co, R).  Figure  1.2  illustrates  the  two  constraints Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  11 
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Replacement  Effects 
Bf'(k)/r>l  (PC)(9) 
co  > 
coc(fc,  R) =  1 - 
XRf{k)/r.  (BC)(10) 
The  agents  located  to  the  right  of  the  vertical  line,  R  = 
r/f'(k),  satisfy 
(PC), while  the  agents  above  the negative-sloped  line,  co  = 
coc(fc,  R) 
=  1 - 
XRf'(k)/r,  satisfy  (BC). Only  the  agents  satisfying  both  invest.  Thus,  the 
aggregate  supply  of  capital  is given  by  the  unique  solution  to  the  fol 
lowing  equation: 
00  00 
k  =  \  R  \  ?(co,  R)dco  dR  (11) 
r/[f'(k))  lJG>c(k,R) 
Again,  it is straightforward  to show  that  k goes  up  in response  to a  lower 
r,  a  higher  X,  and  a  First-Order  Stochastic-Dominant  shift  of  the  net 
worth  distribution  to  the  right. 
Let  us  look  at  the  effects  of  an  improved  credit  market  more  closely. 
An  increase  in X from  X" to A,+ leads  to an  increase  in k from  k~ to k+, and 
hence  to  a decline  in/'(fc)  from/r(fc~)  to f'(k+).  These  changes  move  the 
vertical  line  to  the  right,  and  the  negative-sloped  line  to  the  left,  as 
shown  by  arrows  in figure  1.2. This  means  that  four  classes  of  the  agents 
may  be  distinguished.  Those  in  A  stop  investing.  Those  in B  continue  in 
vesting.  Those  in C  start  investing.  The  rest  never  invest.  This  means 
that,  as  a  result  of  a  credit  market  improvement,  the  rich  but  less  pro 12  Matsuyama 
ductive  agents  in  A  are  replaced  by  the poor  but more  productive  agents 
in C.14 Clearly,  those  in C  are  better  off  because  they  are now  able  to bor 
row  and  invest  in  the  profitable  project,  while  those  in A  and  in B  are 
worse  off  because  their  projects  become  less  profitable  due  to  the  entry 
by  the  agents  in C. 
To  explore  further  implications,  let us  now  look  at  a  more  specific  ex 
ample.  Imagine  that  there  are  only  two  types  of  agents.  Their  relative 
productivity  and  net  worth  satisfy  R:  <  R2,  coa  >  co2, so  that  type-1 
agents  are  richer  but  less  productive  than  type-2  agents.  Let  6 denote  the 
share  of  type-1.  Suppose  furthermore  that  1 - 
coa  <  (R1/R2)(l 
- 
co2) and 
consider  the  effects  of  an  increase  in X from  X~ to X+, where  1 - 
co1  <  X' < 
(RJRJil 
- 
co2)  <  X+ <  1 - 
co2.  Then,  for  type-1,  (PC)  is  more  stringent 
than  (BC) both  before  and  after  the  change,  and,  for  type-2,  (BC)  is  more 
stringent  than  (PC)  both  before  and  after  the  change.  Furthermore, 
when  0 and  r are  chosen  to  satisfy  the  inequalities, 
1 - 







X~R2  r  R1  r  X+R2 
' 
one  can  show  that  the  equilibrium  takes  the  following  form: 
Before  the  change  (X 
= 
X~), RJ'{k~) 
=  r,  where  k~ < 
Rfi.  That  is,  (PC) 
is binding  for  type-1  and  (BC)  is violated  for  type-2.  Some  type-1  in 
vest,  but  no  type-2  invest. 










That  is,  (BC)  is binding  for  type-2.  (PC)  is violated  for  type-1.  Some 
type-2  invests,  but  no  type-1  invest. 
Thus,  with  X = 
X~, only  the unproductive  but  rich  agents  invest,  none  of 
whom  is credit-constrained.  With  X = 
X+, only  the  productive  but  poor 
agents  invest,  all  of whom  are  credit-constrained.  Furthermore,  aggre 
gate  investment  (the  total  amount  of  the  inputs  going  into  the  projects) 
may  decline  as  a  result  of  an  improvement  in  the  credit  market.  This  is 
because  investment  technologies  improve  endogenously,  as  the  credit 
shifts  from  the  less  productive  agents  to  the more  productive  agents. 
This  is by  no  means  a peculiar  feature  of  the  above  example.  More 
generally,  a better  credit  market  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  there  are 
less  credit-constrained  among  the  active  firms.  Consider  the  two  ex 
treme  cases.  If X = 
1,  the  credit  market  is perfect  so  that  no  firms  are 
credit-constrained.  If X = 
0,  on  the  other  hand,  the  credit  market  shuts 
down  completely.  Hence,  only  the  firms  that  can  self-finance  entirely  op Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  13 
erate  so  that no  active  firms  are  credit-constrained.  Only  in  the  interme 
diate  cases  should  we  expect  some  active  firms  to be  credit-constrained. 
All  the models  so  far have  been  in partial  equilibrium  in  that  the market 
rate  of  return  required  by  the  lenders,  r, is treated  as  exogenous.  It is now 
endogenized  in general  equilibrium. 
4  General  Equilibrium  with  Endogenous  Saving:  Capital 
Deepening  versus  Net  Worth  Effects 
Let  us  go  back  to the homogeneous  case, where  all  (investing)  agents  have 
the  same  R  and  co. In  this  section,  we  call  them  "entrepreneurs,"  because 
we  also  add  some  agents,  "savers,"  who  have  no  access  to  the  investment 
projects.  The  savers  are  endowed  with  co?  units  of  the  input.  In addition 
to  the period-1  consumption,  they  also  consume  some  of  the  inputs  in pe 
riod  0.  More  specifically,  they maximize  U?  = 
V(C?0)  +  C?,  subject  to  the 
budget  constraint,  C? = 
r(co? 
- 
Co0),  where  Vis  an  increasing,  concave  func 
tion.  Then  they  choose  their  saving,  S? =  co?  - 
C?Q,  such  that V  (co? 
- 
S?) 
=  r, 
which  defines  their  saving  function,  S?(r) 
=  w?-  (V'y\r).  Since  the  entre 
preneurs  save  all  of  their  endowment,  the  aggregate  saving  of  this  econ 
omy,  or  the  total  inputs  available  to be  used  in the projects,  is given  by  S(r) 
=  co  +  S?(r) 
=  co  +  co?  - 
(V)_1(r).  Since  these  inputs  are  converted  into  cap 
ital at  the  rate  equal  to R,  the  aggregate  supply  of  capital  is given  by 
k = 
RS(r) 
=  R[co  +  co?  - 
{V')-\r)l  (RQ(12) 
where  (RC)  stands  for  the  Resource  Constraint  of  the  economy.  As  before, 
(PC)  and  (BC) of  the  entrepreneurs  are  given  by 
Rf'(k)  =  Max  1, 
i^ 
r  (PC)  +  (BC)(5) 
Equations  (5) and  (12)  jointly  determine  k and  r. These  equilibrium  con 
ditions  may  be  rewritten  more  compactly  as 
co  +  co?  -  (W(r) -  S(r)  = I(r)  - 
I(/')-if  Max  1,  ~ 
J  j\ 
(13) 
Figure  1.3  depicts  equation  (13)  by  the  intersection  of  the  upward 
sloping  aggregate  saving  schedule,  S(r),  and  the  downward-sloping  ag 
gregate  investment  schedule,  l(r).15  Note  that  S(r)  depends  on  the  aggre 
gate  endowment,  co  +  co?,  while  I(r) depends  on  the  entrepreneur's  en 
dowment,  co. 14  Matsuyama 
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Figure  1.3 
General  Equilibrium  with  Endogenous  Saving 
Figure  1.4  shows  the  effect  of  a  higher  endowment  of  the  savers, 
which  shifts  the  saving  schedule  to  the  right,  while  keeping  the  invest 
ment  schedule  intact.  An  increase  in  the  aggregate  saving,  which  fi 
nances  the  aggregate  investment,  means  that more  capital  is produced. 
Due  to  diminishing  returns,  the marginal  productivity  of  capital  de 
clines,  which  leads  to a  low  rate  of  return.  In essence,  this  is the  standard 
neoclassical  capital  deepening  effect. 
The  effect  of  a higher  X,  when  (BC)  is binding  (X +  co  <  1),  is shown  in 
figure  1.5. The  investment  schedule  shifts  to  the  right,  while  the  saving 
schedule  remains  intact.  By  easing  the  borrowing  constraint,  more  en 
trepreneurs  could  borrow  to finance  their  investment.  With  the upward 
sloping  supply  of  saving,  this  raises  the  equilibrium  rate  of  return.  Re 
distributing  the wealth  from  the  savers  to  the  entrepreneurs  (Aco 
=  -Aco? 
>  0) would  have  the  same  effect,  through  the pure  net worth  effect. 
The  effect  of  a higher  net  worth  of  the  entrepreneurs  (Aco >  0), when 
(BC)  is binding  (X +  co  <  1), without  the  offsetting  change  in  the  saver's 
wealth,  may  be  viewed  as  a  combination  of  the  two  effects  discussed 
above:  the  capital  deepening  effect,  due  to an  increase  in  the  aggregate Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  15 




Figure  1.4 
Capital  Deepening  Effect:  Aco0 >  0 
-  k/R 
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Figure  1.5 
Net  Worth  Effect:  Aco  =  -Aco0  >  0  (and  AX  >  0)  for  X +  co <  1. 
saving,  and  the pure  net  worth  effect,  which  increases  the  aggregate  in 
vestment.  When  the  latter  dominates  the  former,  as  shown  in  figure  1.6, 
the  equilibrium  rate  of  return  goes  up.16 However,  once  the  entrepre 
neur's  net  worth  becomes  high  enough  to make  (BC)  irrelevant  (X +  co 
>  1),  a  further  increase  in  co reduces  the  rate  of  return,  because  only 
the  capital  deepening  effect  is  at work.  In  short,  the  equilibrium  rate 
of  return  may  respond  non-monotonically  to  the  borrower  net  worth. 
More  generally,  a  low  rate  of  return  in  equilibrium  could  be  a  sign  of 
either  good  or  bad  economic  conditions.  In  section  6, we  will  explore 16  Matsuyama 
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Figure  1.6 
Combined  Effects:  Aco>  0,  for  X +  co<  1. 
further  implications  of  this  feature  of  the model  in the  context  of  a global 
economy.17 
5  General  Equilibrium  with  Heterogeneous  Projects 
It has  been  assumed  so  far  that  each  agent  has  access  to only  one  type  of 
project.  Let  us  now  look  at a  model  where  agents  can  choose  which  proj 
ect  to  invest. 
Again,  we  consider  the world  with  homogenous  entrepreneurs  with 
unit  mass,  each  of whom  is endowed  with  co  units  of  the  input  at period 
0 and  consumes  only  at period  1. To  keep  it simple,  we  assume  that  there 
are  no  outside  agents,  "savers."  Despite  that  this makes  the  aggregate 
saving  inelastic,  credit  market  imperfections  and  the net  worth  can  still 
affect  the  equilibrium  allocations  by  changing  the  composition  of  credit 
flows. 
Entrepreneurs  can  choose  one  (and  only  one)  of  /  non-divisible 
projects  (; 
= 
1,2,...,/).  A  Type-j  project  converts  m.  >  co  units  of  the  in 
puts  in period  0  into 
m;R; 
units  in capital  and 
m]B] 
units  in  the  consump 
tion  good.  Thus,  the projects  may  differ  in  the  set-up  cost,  productivity, 
as well  as  the  types  of  the  goods  produced  (and  their  compositions).  By 













r] +  rco in period  1. Since  the  agent  can  always  consume 
rco by  lending,  the  Profitability  Constraint  for  a Type-j  Project  (PC-;)  is 
given  by Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  17 
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?,./'(*:)+  B;>r. (PC-;)(14) 
We  introduce  the  credit  market  imperfections  by  assuming  that  only  a 
fraction  X. of  capital  and  a  fraction  of  jul;  of  the  consumption  good  are 
pledgeable  to  the  lenders.  Then,  the Borrowing  Constraint  for  a Type-]  Proj 
ect  (BC-j)  is given  by 




co).  (BC-/)(15) 
Both  (PC-;)  and  (BC-/)  need  to  be  satisfied  for  the  credit  to  flow  into 
type-/  projects. 
Figure  1.7  shows  the graph  of 
'JLR,/'(*)  +  u.B. 




J  ' 
Both  (PC-j)  and  (BC-/)  are  satisfied  if and  only  if r  < 
/^(co). 
In other  words, 
this  graph  shows  the maximal  rate  of  return  that  a  type-;  project  can  gen 
erate  to  the  lenders  without  violating  (PC-/)  nor  (BC-;).  As  shown,  the 
graph  is  increasing  in  co  when  (BC-;)  is  the  relevant  constraint.  The  rea 
son  is  that  a higher  net  worth  eases  the borrowing  constraint  as  the  en 
trepreneurs  need  to  borrow  less.  This  makes  it possible  for  them  to 
promise  a higher  rate  of  return  to  the  lenders.  The  graph  is  flat when 
(PC-;)  is  the  relevant  constraint. 
To  describe  the  equilibrium  formally,  let  n.  denote  the measure  of 
type-;  projects  initiated  (and  of  the  agents  who  invest  in  type-;  projects). 
Since  each  type-;  project  requires  m.  units  of  the  input,  the  aggregate  sav 
ing  equals  the  aggregate  investment  if and  only  if 18  Matsuyama 
<0  = 
5>;">  (17) 
j 
Since  each  type-;  project  produces  m;R; 
units  of  capital,  the  total  supply 
of  capital  is given  by 
k = 
5>,R,*,.).  (18) 
Finally,  as  the  agents  compete  with  one  another  for  credit  and  they  can 
choose  freely  among  all  the  projects,  credit  goes  only  to  the  projects 
which  have  the  highest  jj(co) 
and  hence  generate  the  highest  rate  of  re 
turn  to  the  lenders,  which  can  be  expressed  as 
\X.RJ'(k)  +  u.B.  1 
r =  Max  (j;.(co)} 
>  r.(co)  = Min  ;  ] 
_ 
^ 




where  the  two  inequalities  in  (19)  are  the  complementarity  slackness 
conditions.  The  equilibrium  of  this  economy  is  fully  characterized  by 
(17)-(19). 
Let  us  now  look  at  some  special  cases. 
5.1  A Model  with  Pure  Capital  Projects:  Endogenous 
Investment-Specific  Technical  Change 
Suppose  B;. 
=  0  for  all; 
= 
1,2,...,/,  as  in  Matsuyama  (2007).  Thus,  the 
projects  do  not  differ  in  the  compositions  of  the  output;  they  all produce 
homogeneous  capital.  In  this  case,  (16)  is simplified  to 
4^  =  Mini?^?,lk  (20) 
f'(k)  [l-co/m/  J 
> 
Note  that  the projects  can  be  ranked  according  to  the RHS  of  (20), which 
is  independent  of  fc, and  hence  independent  of  the  allocation  of  the 
credit.  This  means  that  the  equilibrium  allocation  of  the  credit  has  a 
bang-bang  feature.  That  is  to  say,  generically,  all  the  credit  goes  to only 
one  type  of  project  at  each  given  level  of  the  net  worth  and  when  a 
change  in  the  net  worth  affects  the  credit  composition,  the  effect  is 
abrupt  and  drastic:  the  credit  switches  completely  from  one  type  to an 
other.  Needless  to  say,  this  is neither  realistic  nor  robust  feature  of  the 
model,  but  it greatly  helps  to  simplify  the  exposition.18 
5.1.1  Procyclical  Productivity  Change  Let  us  begin  with  the  case 
where  / 
=  2 and  R2>  R1>  Xftx  > X2R2.  In  words,  there  are  trade-offs  be Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  19 
tween  productivity  and  agency  problems.  Project  2  is  more  productive, 
hence  appealing  to  the  borrowers,  while  Project  1 offers  more  pledge 
able  return  per  unit  of  investment,  which  makes  them  potentially 
"safer"  or  a  "more  secure"  alternatives  for  the  lenders.  Such  tradeoffs 
can  be  important  when  some  advanced  projects  that  use  leading  edge 
technologies  may  be  subject  to bigger  agency  problems  than  some  mun 
dane  projects  that  use  well-established  technologies. 
Figures  1.8  and  1.9  show  two ways  in  which  the  graphs  of  (20)  for; 
= 
1 and  2  could  intersect  with  each  other.  In both  cases,  there  is a  critical 
net  worth  level,  coc,  below  which  all  the  credit  flows  to  type-1  projects 
(nx 
=  1 - 
n2 
= 
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0). Then,  from  (17)  and  (18), we  can  show  that  the  equilib 
rium  supply  of  capital  is 
fl  ifco<coc, 
k = 
Rm<o,  where  /(co) 
= 
(21) 
[2  ifco>coc, 
as  shown  in figure  1.10. Thus,  a higher  net worth  can  raise  the productiv 
ity of  the  investment  technologies  used  from  Rx  to R2.  In short,  the  invest 
ment  productivity  changes  procyclically  through  the  credit  channel.  The 
intuition  should  be  clear. With  a  low  net  worth,  the  agents  have  to  rely 
heavily  on  borrowing.  Thus  the  saving  flows  into  type-1  projects,  which 
generate  the  higher  rate  of  pledgeable  return.19 When  net  worth  im 
proves,  the  borrowers  need  to borrow  less, which  enables  the  entrepre 
neurs  to offer  the higher  return  to the  lenders  with  type-2  projects,  despite 
that  they  generate  the  lower  pledgeable  return  per  unit  of  investment. 
The  equilibrium  rate  of  return  is now  given  by 
r(co)  = 
Mini?-^f-,  1} RRJ'(Rma>) (22) 
[ 1 - 
co/m/(co) J 
Note  that  a  higher  net  worth  affects  the  equilibrium  rate  of  return 
through  three  separate  channels.  First,  it allows  the borrowers  to pledge 
more  to  the  lenders  per  unit  of  lending.  Second,  the  credit  composition 
may  shift  toward  more  productive  projects.  These  two  channels  work  in 
the  direction  of  a higher  rate  of  return.  Offsetting  this  is  the  usual  capi 
tal deepening  effect,  which  works  in  the direction  of  a  lower  return.  The 
overall  effect  can  go  either  way. Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  21 
Let  us  briefly  consider  the  implications  of  an  increase  in 
Xr One  may 
think  that  a  better  corporate  governance  or  contractual  enforcement 
would  always  cause  the  credit  to  flow  into  the more  productive  invest 
ment  projects.  That  is certainly  the  case,  if the  improvement  raises  X2. But 
what  if  it raises  Xxl Look  at  figure  1.9.  In  this  case,  a higher  X1  leads  to a 
higher  coc.  This  offers  some  cautions.  If an  attempt  to  improve  corporate 
governance  is  more  effective  for  the well-established  industries,  where 
the nature  of  the  agency  problems  are  relatively  well  understood  (type-1 
projects),  it  would  end  up  preventing  the  saving  from  flowing  into  new, 
but  more  productive  technologies,  run  by  small  venture  capital,  where 
the nature  of  the  agency  problems  are  less  understood  (type-2  projects).20 
Dynamic  Implications:  Credit  Traps 
We  have  so  far  treated  co  as  exogenous.  Let  us  now  explore  the  dynamic 
implications  of procyclical  investment-specific  technological  changes  by 
allowing  some  positive  feedback  from  k  to  co.  To  keep  it simple,  we  fol 
low  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1989)  and  consider  the world  where  the  econ 
omy  consists  of  a  sequence  of  overlapping  generations  a  la Diamond 
(1965).  Time  is discrete  and  extends  from  zero  to  infinity  (t 
= 
0,1,2,...). 
In each  period,  a new  generation  of  the homogenous  agents  arrives  and 
stays  active  for  two  periods.  For  generation-f  (those  "born"  in period  t), 
their  "period  0"  is period  t and  their  "period  1"  is period  t +  1. They  dif 
fer  from  the  two-period  agents  discussed  above  only  in  that,  instead  of 
being  endowed  with  a  fixed  co, they  are  endowed  with  ?,  the  "hidden 
factors"  in  fixed  supply,  which  are  used  with  the  capital  stock  produced 
by  generation-(f  -1),  kt,  in the production  of  the  final  good,  F(kt, Q,  (where 
the  final  good  may  be  used  both  as  the  consumption  good  and  the  input 






W(kt)  during  period  t. Then,  at  the  end  of  period  t,  they  enter  the 
credit  relationship  among  themselves  and  produce  kt+1,  which  will  be 
come  available  in period  t +  1, and  used  to produce  the  final  good  with 
the  "hidden  factors"  in  fixed  supply  supplied  by  generation-^  +  1). The 
dynamics  of  this  overlapping  generations  economy  are  described  simply 
by  replacing  co  by W(kt)  and  k by  kt+1 in equation  (21), which  becomes 
fl  if  co  <  coc, 
K+i 
= 
V<jy>W(fc*)'where  /(?>) 
= 
(23) 
[2  if  co  >  coc. 
For  any  initial  condition,  k0,  the  entire  equilibrium  trajectory  can  be  ob 
tained  simply  by  iterating  (23)  forward.21 22  Matsuyama 
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Credit  Traps 
In  what  follows,  let us  assume  that W(0) 
= 
0,  W(k)/k  is  monotonically 
decreasing,  with  limjt_>0W(fc)//c 
=  o?  and  \ivcvk_^JN(k)/k 
? 
0, which  is  the 
case  if  f(k) 
? 
ka, with  0 < a  <  1. Under  these  assumptions,  the  dynamics 
of  the  form,  kt+1 
= 
R;W(A:,), 
are  characterized  by monotone  convergence 
to  the unique  positive  steady  state,  for  any  fixed  /.  In other  words,  with 
out  heterogeneous  projects,  or without  credit  market  imperfections,  the 
dynamics  of  the  economy  look  like  the  standard  neoclassical  one-sector 
model  a  la Solow.  This  may  not  be  the  case with  (23), because  credit  mar 
ket  imperfections  cause  endogenous  productivity  changes  in  invest 
ment  technologies. 
Figure  1.11  illustrates  one  of  three  generic  cases.  It  shows  the  case 
where  fc* < kc  < fc**,  where  fc*, fc**, and  kc are  defined  by  fc*  = 
R1  W(fc*),  fc** 
= 
R2W(fc**),  and W(kc) 
= 
coc.  There  are  two  stable  steady  states,  fc* and 
fc**. The  lower  one,  k*, may  be  interpreted  as  a  credit  trap.  In  this  steady 
state,  the net  worth  is  low  so  that  the  saving  flows  into  the projects  that 
generate  the higher  pledgeable  return  per  unit  of  investment,  although 
they  produce  less  capital.  The  resulting  lower  supply  of  capital  leads  to 
a  lower  price  of  the  endowment  held  by  the  next  generation  of  entre 
preneurs,  and  hence  a  low  net  worth.  Which  steady  state  the  economy 
will  converge  to depends  entirely  on  the  initial  condition.  If  the  econ 
omy  starts  below  kc,  it converges  monotonically  to  fc*.  If  the  economy 
starts  above  kc,  it  converges  monotonically  to  A;**. Thus,  kc may  be 
viewed  as  the  critical  threshold  level  for  economic  development.22 
5.1.2  Countercyclical  Productivity  Change  Consider  now  the  case 
where  / 
=  2 with  R2>RX>  X2R2 > XXRV and  mjm2  <  (1 
- 
^2R2/R1)/(1 
- Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  23 
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Figure  1.12 
XJ  <  1.  Thus,  type-1  projects  are  less  productive  and  generate  less 
pledgeable  rate  of  return  than  type-2  projects.  However,  the  set  up  cost 
is  much  smaller  for  type-1  projects,  so  the  agents  need  to borrow  much 
less  to  invest  into  these  projects,  which  may  give  type-1  projects  advan 
tage  over  type-2  projects.  For  example,  type-1  projects  could  represent 
family  operated  farms  or  other  small  businesses,  while  type-2  projects 
represent  the  investments  in  the  corporate  sector.  Or,  type-1  projects 
represent  traditional  light  industries,  such  as  textile  and  furniture, 
which  require  a  relatively  small  initial  expenditure,  while  type-2  proj 
ects  represent  modern  heavy  industries,  such  as  steel,  industrial  equip 
ments,  petrochemical,  and  pharmaceutical  industries  that  require 
a  rel 
atively  large  initial  expenditure. 
Figure  1.12  shows  that  the graphs  of  (20)  for; 
=  1 and  2  intersect  twice 
with  each  other.  For  an  intermediate  value  of  coc  <  co  <  cocc,  all  the  credit 
goes  to  type-1  projects,  nx 
=  1 - 
n2 
=  1. Otherwise,  all  the  credit  goes  to 
type-2  projects,  nx 
=  1 - 
n2 
=  0. Therefore,  the  equilibrium  supply  of  cap 
ital  is now  given  by 
r2  if  co  <  coc 
k = 
Rm<o,  where  /(co) 
=  < 1  if  coc  <  co  <  cocc,  (24) 
[2  ifco>cocc, 
as  shown  in  figure  1.13. When  the  net  worth  is very  low,  the  entrepre 
neurs  must  rely  almost  entirely  on  external  finance,  so  that  the  saving 
flows  into  type-2  projects  that  generate  more  pledgeable  return  per  unit 
of  investment.  As  the net worth  rises,  the  entrepreneurs  can  offer  a  more 
attractive  rate  of  return  with  type-1  projects  than with  type-2  projects, 24  Matsuyama 
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because  they  need  to borrow  little  for  type-1  projects.  Hence,  a rise  in the 
net  worth  leads  to a  shift  of  the  credit  toward  less  productive  projects.  If 
the net worth  rises  even  further,  then  the borrowing  need  becomes  small 
enough  for  type-2  projects  that  the  credit  shifts  back  to  more  productive 
type-2  projects. 
In  this  case,  a higher  X1  reduces  coc  and  hence  expands  the  range  in 
which  the  savings  flow  into  the more  productive  type-2  projects,  which 
offers  a  caution  when  thinking  about  alleviating  credit  market  imper 
fections  targeted  to  small  businesses. 
Dynamic  Implications:  Leapfrogging  and Credit  Cycles  as a Trap 
Let  us  explore  the  dynamic  implications  by  replacing  co  by W(kt)  and  k 
by  kt+1 in  (24)  to obtain 
'2  if  co  <  coc 
K+i 
= 
Rj(W(kt))W(K)>where  K?) 
=  '  1  if  coc  <  co  <  cocc, (25) 
,2  if  co  >  cocc, 
Figures  1.14  and  1.15  illustrate  two  possibilities  among  many.  In  figure 
1.14,  kc <  A:*  <  kcc <  fc**, where  kc and  kcc are  defined  by  W(kc) 
= 
coc  and 
W(kcc) 
= 
cocc,  and  the  two  stable  steady  states,  fc* and  A;**, are  again  de 
fined  by  fc* = 
RaW(fc*)  and  fc** = 
R2W(fc**).  If kc<k0<  kcc, the  economy 
converges  monotonically  to  fc*.  If k0 >  kcc, the  economy  converges  mo 
notonically  to fc**.  Hence,  as  long  as we  focus  our  attention  to  the  range 
above  kc,  the  dynamics  look  similar  to  figure  1.11. However,  it can  be 
more  complicated  if the  economy  starts  below  kc. After  the  initial  phase Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  25 
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Credit  Cycles  as  a Trap 
of  growth,  the  economy  will  converge  to k*,  if it falls  into  the  intermedi 
ate  interval,  (kc, kcc).  However,  if  R2W(kc)  > kcc, the  economy  could  bypass 
this  stage  and  converge  to fc**, as  indicated  by  the  arrows  in  figure  1.14. 
In  this  case,  the  long  run  performance  of  the  economy  depends  sensi 
tively  on  the  initial  condition.23  Furthermore,  it suggests  the  possibility 
of  leapfrogging.  That  is, an  economy  that  starts  at  a  lower  level may  take 
over  another  economy  that  starts  at a higher  level.24  In figure  1.15,  A:*  < kc 
<  kcc <  fc** and  R2W(kc)  <  kcc. For  kQ  <  kcc, the  economy  fluctuates  indefi 
nitely.25  Along  these  credit  cycles,  an  improvement  in  the  current  net 
worth  causes  a  shift  in  the  credit  towards  the  less  productive  projects 
that  contribute  less  to  the  future  net  worth.  The  resulting  decline  in  the 
net  worth  causes  the  credit  to  shift  back  towards  the  projects  that  help 26  Matsuyama 
more  to build  the  net  worth  in  the  following  period.  For  k0 >  kcc, on  the 
other  hand,  the  economy  converges  monotonically  to  the unique  stable 
steady  state,  A:**.  Thus,  this may  also  be  viewed  as  another  example  of 
credit  traps  except  that  the  traps  here  take  the  form  of  cycles  around  kc, 
instead  of  the  lower  steady  state,  k*. 
5.2  A Model  with  Private  Benefits 
A  higher  net worth  might  also  shift  the  composition  of  credit  toward  less 
"socially  productive"  projects,  when  the  agents  are  attracted  to running 
some  "socially  unproductive"  projects,  because  they  generate  more 
"private  benefits,"  "personal  satisfaction"  or  some  other  consumption 
values,  which  mean  little  to  the  lenders.  To  capture  this  idea,  let R1 < R2, 
and  Bx > B2 
=  0 with  X1 
= 
X2 
=  1 and  |i1 
= 
\i2 
=  0. Thus,  capital  is  fully 
pledgeable,  but  the  consumption  good  is not  pledgeable  at  all.  type-1 
projects  are  less  "socially  productive"  than  type-2,  but  it is a  lot of  fun  to 
run  type-1  projects.  Let  AR  = 
R2-Rl>0.  From  (17)-(19),  one  can  show 
that  k = 
R2co  if  co  <  coc 
= 
(AR/R2)m1  or  AR/'(R2co)  >B1;k 
= 
Rx(o  if  co  >  coc 
and  AR/'(Raa)) 
< 
Br  If  co >  coc and  AR/'^co)  >  B1  >  AR/'(R2g>),  then 
ARf'(k) 
= 
Bv which  means  RjCO  < k < R2co.  In  words,  all  the  credit  goes  to 
type-2  projects  either when  the  agents  cannot  borrow  for  type-1  projects 
or  the  private  benefits  of  type-1  projects  are  not  big  enough  to  compen 
sate  its  low  productivity  in capital  when  everybody  else  invests  in  type 
2;  all  the  credit  goes  to  type-1  projects  when  the  agents  can  borrow  for 
type-1  projects  and  the private  benefits  of  type-1  projects  are  big  enough 
when  everybody  else  invests  in  type-1.  Otherwise,  the  credit  goes  to 
both  types  so  that  the  total  productivity  (i.e.,  including  the  private  ben 
efit)  are  equalized  between  type-1  and  type-2. 
Figure  1.16  illustrates  the  case where  B1 > ARf,((R1/R2)ARm1).  Then, 
[2  ifco<coc, 
k = 
Rma>,  where  /(co) 
= 
\  (26) 
[1  if  co>coc. 
In  this  case,  the  agents  enjoy  running  type-1  projects  so much  that  they 
will  do  so whenever  they  are  rich  enough  to borrow,  that  is,  co  >  coc 
= 
(AR/R2)rar 
Dynamic  Implications:  Credit  Cycles 
Again,  we  can  look  at  the dynamic  implications  by  setting  co  = 
W(kt)  and 
k  = 
kt+1  in  equation  (26).  Figure  1.17  shows  the  possibility  of  credit Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  27 
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Credit  Cycles 
cycles.  During  booms,  a high  net worth  allows  the  agents  to pursue  proj 
ects  that  generate  personal  satisfaction  but  less  capital,  which  slows 
down  the  economy.  During  recessions,  the  agents  cannot  pursue  such 
projects,  hence  the  credit  goes  to projects  that  generate  more  capital, 
which  leads  to  the next  boom.  Note  that  the welfare  implications  of  these 
credit  cycles  are very  different  from  those  shown  in figure  1.15. Here  the 
booms  occur  as  a result  of  the  misallocation  of  credit,  and  they  end when 
a sufficiently  high  net worth  eventually  corrects  the misallocation.  If the 
credit  markets  were  perfect,  and  the  agents  could  fully  pledge  their 28  Matsuyama 
"private  benefits"  to  the  lenders,  the booms  would  not  occur  and with 
out  the booms  the  economy  would  never  experience  slowdowns.  In con 
trast,  the  recessions  along  the  cycles  shown  in  figure  1.15  occur  as  a  re 
sult  of  the misallocation  of  credit. 
53  A Model  with  Pure  Capital  and  Consumption  Projects 
Now  let us  look  at  the  case where  / 
=  2 with  R1 
=  R  > R2 
=  0 and  Bx 
=  0 
<B2 
=  B. Thus,  type-1  projects  produce  only  capital,  while  type-2  proj 
ects  produce  only  the  consumption  good. 
The  equilibrium  conditions,  (17)  through  (19), now  become 
co  = 
m1n1  +  m2n2  (27) 
k = 
m^Rnx  (28) 
Mini-?-,  1  \Rf'(k) 
-  r > 
Mini-^-,  1  B; n2 >  0.  (29) 
[1-co/V  \JKf  [l-co/m2  J 
2  V ; 
Note  that  (29)  contains  the  complementary  slackness  condition  only  for 
type-2.  Since  only  type-1  projects  produce  capital,/'(0) 
=  <*>  ensures  nx > 
0, hence  the  first  equality  in  (29). 
Figure  1.18  shows  the  equilibrium  in  the  absence  of  credit  market  im 
perfection  (Xx 
= 
1,  jll2 
= 
1), which  is given  by 
Rd)  ifco<cor, 
k  =  (30) 
R(Oc,  ifco>coc, 
k 
Rcoc  _.^^^^__^_ 
-L-:-  co 
O COc 
Figure  1.18 
Perfect  Credit  Case Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  29 
where  coc  is now  defined  by  Rf'(R(dc) 
=  B. Thus,  all  the  credit  goes  to  the 
capital  generating  project  until  its  return  becomes  equal  to  the  return 
of  the  consumption  generating  project,  which  absorbs  all  additional 
credit. 
5.3.1  Persistence  of  Inefficient  Recessions:  Financial  Accelerator 
Starting  from  this  benchmark,  let us  introduce  the  credit  market  imper 
fection  to  the  capital-generating  type-1  projects  (X1  <  1 and  \i2 
= 
1).  With 
a  sufficiently  small  Xv  there  is  an  interval  of  co, in which  some  of  the 
credit  flows  into  type-2  projects  (k  < Rco),  despite  that  type-1  generates  a 
higher  return  than  type-2  projects,  Rf'(k)  >  B,  as  shown  in  figure  1.19. 
This  under-investment  to  type-1  projects  occurs  because  (BC-1)  is bind 
ing: Rf  (k) > XxRf  (fc)/(l 
- 
(D/mJ 
=  B. The  graph  is upward-sloping  over 
this  interval,  because  a higher  net  worth  shifts  the  credit  flows  from  the 
consumption-generating  type-2  to  the  capital-generating  type-1  proj 
ects  by  easing  (BC-1). 
By  setting  co  = 
W(A:,)  and  k = 
kt+1, one  can  easily  see  how  a credit  mar 
ket  imperfection  of  this  kind  introduces  persistence  into  the  dynamics. 
Figures  1.20  through  1.22  show  three  possibilities.26  Figure  1.20  repli 
cates  the  key  result  of  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1989).  There  is  a unique 
steady  state,  k*, which  is characterized  by  the  under-investment.  Now 
imagine  that  the  economy  is hit  by  a one-time-shock,  which  temporarily 
reduces  the  productivity  of  the  final  goods  production.  Without  the 
credit  market  imperfection,  the  economy  would  go  back  to  its  steady 
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Slow  Recovery 
however,  the  economy  goes  back  only  gradually  towards  its  steady 
state,  fc*, as  indicated  by  the  arrow.  Even  though  the  shock  itself  is  tem 
porary,  it reduces  the  current  net  worth,  which  tightens  the  borrowing 
constraint,  reducing  the  future  investment.  This  in  turn  reduces  future 
net  worth,  and  so  on.  In  short,  the  credit  multiplier  or  financial  acceler 
ator mechanism  creates  an  echo  effect,  transforming  the  i.i.d.  shocks  into 
positive  serial  correlations.  In figure  1.21,  the unique  steady  state  is fc* = Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  31 
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Multiple  Steady  States 
RW(kc),  in  which  the marginal  productivity  is equalized  across  projects 
and  there  is no  under-investment.  However,  the  financial  accelerator  is 
at work  at  lower  ranges.  Thus,  when  the  economy  starts with  a  low  cap 
ital  stock,  the  credit  market  imperfection  slows  down  the  recovery  pro 
cess,  prolonging  the  inefficient  recessions.  In  figure  1.22,  this mecha 
nism  is  so  strong  that  it  creates  two  stable  steady  states,  the  lower  of 
which  is characterized  by  the  under-investment,  and  the  economy  may 
be  permanently  trapped  into  a  recession.  All  of  these  cases  imply  per 
sistence  because  the  type  of  investment  that helps  to enhance  the  future 
borrower  net  worth  is subject  to credit  market  imperfections. 
5.3.2  Inefficient  Booms  and  Volatility  Let  us  now  introduce  the 
credit market  imperfection  to type-2  projects  instead  (A,a 
=  1 and  jli2  <  l).27 
With  a  sufficiently  small  |i2,  there  is an  interval  of  co for which  the  credit 
continues  to flow  into  the  capital-generating  type-1  projects,  even  after 
the  return  of  type-1  projects  becomes  lower  than  type-2  projects  (k > 
Rcoc),  as  shown  in  figure  1.23.  This  over-investment  to  type-1  projects  oc 




Rf(k)  < B. Note 
that  the  graph  is non-monotonic.  It is  initially  upward-sloping,  because 
all  the  additional  credit  go  to  type-1  projects  because  net  worth  is  too 
low  for  type-2  projects  to be  financed:  |H2B/(1 
- 
co/m2)  < Rf'(R(ri)  <  B. 
Eventually,  net  worth  becomes  sufficiently  high  so  that  some  credit 
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Figure  1.23 
Over-Investment  to Type-1 
and  credit  flow  from  the  capital-generating  type-1  to  the  consumption 
generating  type-2  projects  by  easing  (BC-2). 
The  non-monotonicity  of  the  graph  carries  over  to  the  dynamics.  In 
stead  of  putting  persistence  into  the  dynamics,  a  credit  market  imper 
fection  of  this  kind  puts  volatility  into  the  dynamics.  It may  generate 
over-shooting,  oscillatory  convergence,  or  endogenous  fluctuations.  In 
figure  1.24,  its unique  steady  state  is unstable  and  the  economy  fluctu 
ates  indefinitely  within  the  interval  I.  One  can  show  that  the  two  condi 
tions  are  necessary  for  endogenous  fluctuations  (as well  as  oscillatory 
convergence  and  over-shooting)  to occur.  First,  B needs  to be  sufficiently 
high;  otherwise,  credit  would  never  flow  into  the  type-2  projects.  Sec 
ond,  |i2 can  be  neither  too  high  nor  too  low.  The  intuition  is  simple.  If 
type-2  projects  suffer  from major  agency  problems  (a small  jn2),  they  are 
never  financed.  (Just  think  of  the  case  \i2 
= 
0, which  completely  shuts 
down  the  credit  for  type-2.)  Hence,  credit  always  goes  only  to  type-1 
projects.  If type-2  projects  are  subject  to  minor  agency  problems  (a large 
|i2),  they  are  financed  as  soon  as  they  become  more  productive  than 
type-1  projects.  (Just  think  of  the  case  (i2 
= 
1,  which  brings  us  back  to  the 
perfect  credit  market  case.)  Endogenous  fluctuations  occur  only  for  in 
termediate  values  of  |i2. That  is,  the  condition  requires  that  the  agency 
problems  associated  with  the  consumption-generating  type-2  projects 
are  too  big  to be  financed  when  the  net  worth  is  low,  but  small  enough 
to be  financed  when  the net  worth  is high.28  Again,  the welfare  implica 
tions  of  these  fluctuations  are  similar  to  the  case  of  figure  1.17  and  op Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  33 
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Figure  1.24 
Inefficient  Booms  and  Volatility 
posite  of  figure  1.15.  That  is,  the misallocation  of  credit  causes  booms, 
which  collapse  when  a sufficiently  high  borrower  net worth  corrects  the 
misallocation  of  the  credit. 
An  interesting  extension  is  to add  some  exogenous  sources  of  fluctu 
ations  to  this model.  For  example,  suppose  that B may  change  over  time. 
Recall  that  B needs  to be  big  enough  for  the  graph  to  look  as  in  figure 
1.24.  If  it  is not  big  enough,  the  downward-sloping  part  of  the  graph  is 
located  far  to  the  right  so  that  the RW(A;,)  intersects  with  the  45?  line  at 
fc**.  If B permanently  stays  small,  then  the  economy  converges  to  fc**. 
However,  imagine  that  every  once  in a while  B becomes  big  enough  to 
make  the  graph  look  as  in  figure  1.24. With  occasional  arrivals  of  alter 
native  investment  opportunities,  which  divert  the  credit  away  from  the 
capital-generating  projects,  the  economy  fluctuates  around  k*,  below 
fc**, at  least  until  B becomes  small  again. 
5.3.3  Hybrid  Cases:  Asymmetric  Cycles  and  Intermittent  Volatility 
The  two  previous  cases  offer  seemingly  conflicting  views  of  credit  mar 
ket  imperfections,  one  suggesting  persistence,  the  other  suggesting 
volatility.  However,  they  are not  actually  conflicting.  Indeed,  each might 
capture  different  phases  of  business  cycles  as  the  following  hybrid 
model  illustrates. 
Let  / 
=  3 with  Rx 






0, B2 > B3 >  0,  and  Xlf  \i2 <  1, 34 Matsuyama 
jli3 
=  1. Thus,  type-1  is  the  only  capital-generating  projects,  while  there 
are  now  two  different  types  of  consumption-generating  (type-2  and 
type-3).  Between  the  two,  type-2  is more  productive  than  type-3,  but 
type-3  is not  subject  to  the borrowing  constraint.  One  could  show,  under 
certain  parameter  values, 
type-2  projects  become  irrelevant  for  a  small  co (because  they  cannot 
satisfy  the  borrowing  constraints)  so  that  type-1  projects  effectively 
compete  with  type-3. 
type-3  projects  become  irrelevant  for  a  large  co (because  more  pro 
ductive  type-2  projects  can  be  financed)  so  that  type-1  effectively 
compete  with  type-2. 
In other  words,  the model  looks  like  the  "persistence  of  inefficient  re 
cessions"  model  within  the  lower  range,  and  the  "inefficient  booms  and 
volatility"  model  within  the higher  range. 
The  dynamics  may  now  look  like  figure  1.25,  combining  the  features 
of  figure  1.21  and  figure  1.24.  In  this  case,  there  is no  stable  steady  state. 
The  equilibrium  path  is characterized  by  asymmetric  cycles,  along  which 
the  economy  goes  through  a slow  recovery  from  recessions,  and,  once  in 
booms,  experiences  a period  of high  volatility,  and  then,  plunges  into  re 
cessions.29  Alternatively,  the  dynamics  may  look  like  figure  1.26,  com 
kt+\ 
.y-p?r-  y 
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Figure  1.26 
bining  the  features  of  figure  1.22  and  figure  1.24.  In  this  case,  there  is a 
unique  stable  steady  state,  fc*. 
Now  consider  the  following  thought  experiment.  Imagine  that  the 
economy  is regularly  hit  by  some  i.i.d.  shocks,  shaking  the  graph  up  and 
down.  Figure  1.26  represents  the  situation  when  the  size  of  a shock  is be 
low  a  certain  threshold  level,  while  figure  1.25  represents  the  situation 
when  the  size  of  a  shock  slightly  exceeds  the  threshold  level.  Then,  for 
most  of  the  time,  the  economy  fluctuates  around  k*,  exhibiting  the 
financial  accelerator  mechanism  a  la  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1989). 
However,  the  economy  encounters  intermittently  bubble  like  asymmet 
ric boom-and-bust  cycles,  during  which  it experiences  volatility  much 
larger  than  the  shock  that  triggers  it. 
6  General  Equilibrium  with  Heterogeneous  Agents 
and  Capital:  Patterns  of  International  Capital  Flows 
We  have  so  far  assumed  that  capital  produced  is homogeneous.  Let  us 
now  look  at  a  model  with  heterogeneous  capital,  where  different  agents 
produce  different  types  of  capital.  One  context  in which  this  problem 
arises  naturally  is  the  case  where  the  agents  differ  in  their  countries  of 
residence  and  capital  they  produce  are  nontradable.30 
Imagine  the world  economy,  consisting  of  two  countries:  North  and 36 Matsuyama 
South.  The  structure  of  each  country  is given  by  the model  with  endoge 
nous  saving  discussed  in section  4. The  two  countries  share  the  identical 
technologies  and  preferences,  but  they may  differ  in X,  co,  and  co?.  To  avoid 
a  taxonomical  analysis,  let us  assume  1 > XN 
> 
Xs > 0,1  >  coN  >  cos  > 0, and  1 
>  co^ 
>  co?  >  0. Both  the  input  endowment  and  the  consumption  good  can 
be  traded  between  the  two  countries.  This  allows  the  agents  to  lend  and 
borrow  across  the borders.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is assumed  that  capital 
(as  well  as  the hidden  factors)  is nontradable.  Let  us  also  assume  that  only 
the  entrepreneurs  in the North  (South)  know  how  to produce  capital  used 
in the production  of  the  consumption  good  in the North  (South).31 We  use 
this model  to explore  the  implications  of  credit  market  imperfections  on 
the patterns  of  international  capital  flows  and  economic  development.32 
The  autarky  equilibrium  of  each  country  is obtained  from  (5) and  (12) 
by  adding  the  subscripts,  / 
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Suppose  now  that  the  two  countries  become  fully  financially  integrated 
so  that  the  agents  from  both  countries  can  lend  and  borrow  their  input  en 
dowments  across  the borders  and  repay  in  the  consumption  good  with 
out  additional  costs.  By  "without  additional  costs,"  is  meant,  among  other 
things,  that  the pledgeability  in each  country,  Xjf 
is  independent  of  the  lo 
cation  of  the  lenders.  Of  course,  one  could  think more  generally  that  the 
borrowers  can  pledge  the  fraction  cpA,.  (0 <  cp  <  1), when  borrowing  from 
abroad.  Here,  however,  the  analysis  is restricted  to  the  two  extreme  cases 
of  the  autarky  cp 
=  0 and  the  full  financial  integration,  cp 
=  l.33 
Full  financial  integration  leads  to a Rate  of Return  Equalization  (RRE) 
across  the  two  countries, 
Min\-^?,  1W  (U 
=  r = Mini -^?,  1U/'  (ks),  (RRE)(34) 
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where/'  (0) 
=  o?  ensures  the  interior  solution,  kN, ks >  0. The  world-wide 
resource  constraint  (WRC)  is given  by 
kN +  ks 
= 
R[SN(r)  +  Ss(r)] 
= 
R[aN  +  co?N  +  cos  +  co?s 
- 
(V)~1(r)].  (WRCH35) 
The  world  equilibrium  is determined  by  (34)-(35),  which  can  also  be 
rewritten  as 




IN(r)  +  Is(r). (36) 
When  Xs/(1 
- 
cos) 
>  1, which  also  implies  ^N/(l 
- 
coN)  >  1,  (RRE)  be 
comes  simply/'  (kN) 
=  r = 
f  (ks), or  equivalently,  kN 
= 
ks.  In  this  case, 
(BC)  is not  binding  in either  country,  so  that  the movement  of  interna 
tional  capital  flows  is entirely  dictated  by  the difference  in  marginal  pro 
ductivity.  As  a  result  of  financial  integration,  the  investment  in South  is 
financed  by  the  lending  from  North,  and  capital  flows  until  the  differ 
ence  in  marginal  productivity  is eliminated. 
Even  when  Xs/(1 
- 
cos) <  1,  so  that  (BC)  is binding  in South,  the  lend 
ing  flows  from North  to South  if  the  two  countries  differ  mostly  in  the 





cos,  co^ >  (0?s.  Then,  the  two  countries  share  the  same  investment 
schedule,  while  North's  investment  schedule  is  located  to  the  right  of 
South's.  Hence,  the  autarky  rate  of  return  is lower  in  North  than  in South 
(rN  <  rs).  With  financial  integration,  the  rates  of  return  are  equalized.  The 
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Figure  1.27 
Neoclassical  View  of  Financial  Integration  (XN 
= 
Xs,  coN 
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as  shown  by  the  intersection  of  the  (common)  investment  schedule  and 
the  average  saving  schedule  (depicted  by  the  upward-sloping  dotted 
curve).  North  experiences  a  rise  in  its  rate  of  return,  which  increases  its 
saving  and  reduces  its  investment,  and  hence  run  a current  account  sur 
plus,  while  South  experiences  a  fall  in  its  rate  of  return,  which  reduces 
its  saving  and  increases  its  investment,  and  hence  run  a current  account 
deficit.  In  short,  North's  saving  flows  to  South  to  finance  its  develop 
ment.  This  captures  the  standard  neoclassical  view  of  the  global  finan 
cial  integration. 
The  reverse  flows  occur,  however,  if  North's  autarky  rate  of  return  is 
higher  than  South's.  In  figure  1.28,  the  two  countries  share  the  same  sav 
ing  schedule,  while  North's  investment  schedule  is  located  to  the  right  of 
South's,  hence,  rN >  rs.  With  financial  integration,  the  rate  of  return  is 
equalized  at  the  level  given  by  the  intersection  of  the  (common)  saving 
schedule  and  the  average  investment  schedule  (depicted  by  the  down 
ward-sloping  dotted  curve).  North  (South)  witnesses  its  rate  of  return  to 
fall  (rise),  its saving  to fall  (rise),  and  its  investment  to rise  (fall),  and  hence 
its  current  account  to  turn  into  a  deficit  (surplus).  In  short,  the  capital 
flight  from  South  finances  North's  investment.  One  way  in  which  the  sit 




co^.  This 
case  captures  the  view  that  weak  corporate  governance  and  any  other  in 
stitutional  factors  contribute  to  financial  insecurity  in South  and  hence 
capital  flight  from  South  to  North.  Another  way  in  which  the  situation  de 
picted  in figure  1.28  can  occur  is XN 
= 






co^  > 0.  In this  case, 
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Capital  Flight  (I): XN >  Xs,  coN 
= 
cos,  co^ 
= 
co?;  OR  Capital  Flight  (II); XN 
= 
Xs,  coN 
- 
cos 
=  co" 
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a  larger  share  of  the wealth  is  in  the hand  of  the  savers  in  the  South  than 
in  the North.  Then,  even  though  the  two  countries  do  not  differ  in  the 
other  dimensions,  the  "capital  flight"  occurs  from  South  to  North.  This  is 
because  the  firms  in the South  have  weaker  balance  sheet  conditions  than 
the  firms  in  the North.  This  makes  the  former  more  dependent  on  exter 
nal  finance,  which  in  turn makes  them  less  credit-worthy.  A  financial  in 
tegration  forces  the  firms  in  the South  to compete  with  those  in  the North 
when  financing  their  investments,  which  put  the  former  in disadvantage. 
As  a  result,  South's  saving  flows  to  finance  North's  investment. 
Figure  1.29  illustrates  the  case where  XN 
= 
Xs,  coN  >  cos, co^ 
= 
co^. In  this 
case,  North's  saving  and  investment  schedules  are  both  located  to  the 
right  of  South's.  If the pure  net  worth  effect  dominates  the  capital  deep 
ening  effect,  we  have  rN  >  rs.35  Again,  this  implies  that, with  financial  in 
tegration,  the  saving  flows  from  South  to  North,  because  the  firms  in the 
South  have  the weaker  financial  position  than  those  in  the North.36 
Note  that,  in  many  of  these  cases,  kN  > ks continues  to hold  after  the  full 
financial  integration,  so  that  the marginal  productivity  of  investment  re 
mains  higher  in  the  South:  Rf  (kN)  < Rf  (ks).  Obviously,  the  assumption 
that  only  the  local  firms  can  produce  the  capital  stock  used  in  the  pro 
duction  of  the  final  good  in each  country,  plays  an  important  role  in  the 
analysis.  If any  firm  from  any  country  could  operate  anywhere  at  the 
same  productivity,  the  difference  in marginal  productivity  would  be 
eliminated  by  two-way  flows,  in which  some  FDI  flows  from  North  to 
South  (some  agents  in  North  produce  capital  in South),  and  at  the  same 
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Capital  Flight  (III):  A,N 
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time,  the  saving  flows  from  South  to North.  Even  if  their  productivity 
declines  when  operating  abroad,  the  two-way  flows  may  occur,  as  long 
as  their  financial  advantage  is  more  than  enough  to  offset  the  produc 
tivity  disadvantage  of  operating  abroad.37 
So  far,  it has  been  assumed  that  the  two  countries  share  the  identical 
technologies.  Obviously,  if  North  is  more  productive  than  South,  the  re 
verse  capital  flows  could  occur.38  For  example,  if RN>  Rs,  the  capital 
flows  from  South  to North  even  without  credit  market  imperfections. 
However,  it is difficult  to draw  a  sharp  distinction  between  the  two  the 
ories,  one  based  on  credit  market  imperfections  and  one  based  on  tech 
nological  differences,  because  the  technological  differences  may  be 
caused  by  credit  market  imperfections.  Recall  that  credit  market  imper 
fections  may  often  prevent  the  credit  from  flowing  into  the most  pro 
ductive  agents  (in  the model  of  section  3.3)  or  the most  productive  proj 
ects  (in  some  models  of  section  5).  To  the  extent  that  credit  market 
imperfections  cause  endogenous  changes  in  investing  technologies,  it 
would  be  a challenge  to  tell  the  two  theories  apart  empirically. 
Dynamic  Implications:  Symmetry-Breaking  and Endogenous  Inequality 
In  the  above  analysis,  it  is shown  how  the  cross-country  net  worth  dis 
tribution  (coN,  cos) affects  the  cross-country  distribution  of  the  capital 
stock  (kN, ks). Let  us  now  introduce  positive  feedback  from  (kN, ks)  to  (coN, 
cos). To  keep  it simple,  let us  remove  the  savers  from  the model.  By  re 
placing  co;  by  Wj(kjt) 
and  k. by  kjt+1 
in  equation  (31), we  obtain  the  dy 
namics  of  each  country  in autarky,  as  follows: 
kjt+1 
= 
RW(kjt)  (;' 
= NorS),  (37) 
which  implies  that  each  country  converges  monotonically  to  A:*,  where 
fc* = 
RW(lfc*). 
From  equations  (34)-(35),  the dynamics  of  the world  economy  under 
financial  integration  are  given  by: 
Ht^'+^-Mt^'1^^ 
(rre)(38) 
KM  +  *sm 
= 
*[W(U  + W(kst)]r  (WRC)(39) 
which  jointly  determine  (kNt+1, kst+1)  as  a  function  of  (kNt, kst). Hence, 
from  any  initial  condition,  (kNQ,  kso),  the  equilibrium  trajectory  can  be 
solved  for by  iterating  (38)  and  (39)  forward. Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  41 
Let  us  look  at  the  steady  states.  In what  follows,  let us  restrict  our 




X,  which  means  that  the  only  possible 
source  of  heterogeneity  across  countries  is  in  the  initial  capital  stocks.39 
If the borrowing  constraints  are binding  in both  countries  in steady  state, 
the  steady  state  conditions  are  given  by 
//(M  =  nK)  (RRE)(40) 
l-W(kN)  1-W(ks) 
kN  +  ks 
= 
R[W(kN)  + W(ks)]  (WRC)(41) 
Figure  1.30  illustrates  these  conditions  for  an  intermediate  value  of R.  It 
shows  that  there  are  three  steady  states.  One  of  them,  (SS),  is symmetric, 
given  by  (kN, ks) 
= 
(A:*,  A:*).  The  other  two  are  asymmetric,  (ASN)  and 
(ASS), given  by  (kN, ks) 
= 
(kH,  kL) and  (kN, ks) 
= 
(kL,  kH),  where  kH  > fc* > kL. 
Furthermore,  (SS)  is unstable  because  Xf(k)/[1 
- 
W(k)],  is  increasing  at 
k = 
k*,  so  that  the pledgeable  rate  of  return  in each  country  is  increasing 
in  the  steady  state  capital  stock.  The  instability  of  (SS)  seems  to  suggest 
that  (ASN) and  (ASS) are  stable,  if  this  is  the  case,  the  two-country  world 
economy  develops  unevenly  under  financial  integration.  Thus,  this  cap 
tures  the  structuralist  view  that poor  countries  are unable  to compete  in 
integrated  capital  markets  against  rich  countries,  which  can  offer  finan 
cial  security  to  the  lenders  and  that  the global  capital  market  contributes 
ks  .  (WRC) 
,  dpS  I  y  kN  = ks 
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Figure  1.30 
Symmetry-Breaking  and  the  Emergence  of  Core-Periphery  Patterns 42  Matsuyama 
to  uneven  development  of  the  world  economy,  creating  the  core 
periphery  patterns  or  and  the  International  Economic  Order,  or  the 
World-System  of  the Rich  and  the Poor.40 
While  the  above  analysis  is suggestive,  verifying  analytically  the  two 
"ifs"  above  is difficult.41  Instead  of  the  two-country  case,  Matsuyama 
(2004a)  studied  the  above  model  with  a  continuum  of  countries  and 
showed  analytically, 
In autarky,  the world  economy  as  a whole  converges  to  the  symmet 
ric  steady  state,  regardless  of  the  initial  distribution  of  capital  stocks 
across  countries. 
For  a sufficiently  small  X, and  for an  intermediate  range  of R,  financial 
integration  causes  a  symmetry-breaking.42  That  is,  the  symmetric 
steady  state  loses  its  stability  and  many  asymmetric  stable  steady 
states  to  emerge.  In  any  stable  steady  state,  some  countries  become 
richer  than  in autarky,  while  other  countries  become  poorer  than  in 
autarky. 
Thus,  the world  economy  is endogenously  divided  into  the  rich  and 
the poor.  Two  implications  of  these  results  deserve  emphasis.  First,  this 
example  demonstrates  how  a partial  improvement  in  the  credit  market 
(a  move  from  9 
=  0  to  cp 
= 
1,  while  keeping  X  less  than  one)  could  have 
dramatic  distributional  consequences  that  are  perhaps  surprising  to 
many;  financial  integration  alleviates  the  credit  market  imperfections  in 
some  countries  and  exacerbates  the  credit  market  imperfections  in other 
countries.  Second,  the  instability  of  the  symmetric  steady  state  and  the 
existence  of  asymmetric  steady  states  occur  only  for  an  intermediate 
value  of R.  This  suggests  the rise  and fall  of  inequality  across  nations.  That 
is,  as  productivity  R  improves  over  time,  the world  economy  may  first 
experience  divergence,  as  some  countries  start  taking  off,  and  then  fol 
low  by  convergence,  as other  countries  start  catching  up,  thereby  gener 
ating  the  inverted  U-curve  patterns  of  inequality  across  nations. 
One  key  assumption  above  is  that  "hidden  factors"  are  nontradable. 
This  means  that  the  investment  in one  country  would  improve  the  fu 
ture  net  worth  of  the  entrepreneurs  in  the  same  country,  but  not  else 
where.  If these  factors  were  freely  tradable,  then  the  investment  in one 
country  would  have  the  same  effect  on  the  net  worth  in  any  country, 
which  would  eliminate  the  persistence  of  inequality  across  countries. 
The  interesting  case would  be when  some  of  these  factors  are  tradable  at 
some  positive  costs.  Then,  the  investment  demand  would  have  bigger Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  43 
spillovers  in  the  neighboring  countries,  which  might  lead  to  some  re 
gional  contagion  effects  as well  as  divergence  at  the  global  scale. 
7  General  Equilibrium  with  Heterogeneous  Agents  with 
Heterogeneous  Projects:  Patterns  of  International  Trade 
In all  the models  with  heterogeneous  agents  above,  it has  been  assumed 
that  each  agent  has  access  to only  one  type  of projects.  Let  us  now  discuss 
a  model  with  heterogeneous  agents,  where  each  agent  has  access  to a di 
verse  set  of projects,  in  the  context  of  international  trade. 
Consider  a variation  of  the Ricardian  model  with  a continuum  of  trad 
able  goods,  indexed  by  z e  [0,1],  a  la  Dornbusch,  Fischer,  and  Samuelson 
(1977).  The  economy  is  populated  by  a  continuum  of  homogeneous 
agents,  each  of whom  is endowed  with  co  <  1 units  of  the  input.  Let  us 
now  call  this  input  labor,  following  the  tradition  of  the  trade  literature. 
The  preferences  are  given  by  symmetric  Cobb-Douglas,  so  that  demand 
for good  z  is D(z) 
= 
E/p{z),  where  p(z)  is  the price  of  good  z and  E  is  the 
aggregate  expenditure  in  this  economy.  To  produce  any  tradable  good, 
the  agents  must  run  a project.  Each  project  in  sector  z  requires  one  unit 
of  labor  and  generates  R  units  of  good  z. Each  agent  may  run  one  proj 
ect  or may  simply  become  a  worker,  by  supplying  the  labor  endowment 
to  other  agents. 
Since  any  project  requires  one  unit  of  labor,  and  the  labor  endowment 
of  any  agent  is  co  <  1, each  agent  who  runs  the project  must  employ  1 -  co 
units  of  labor  supplied  by  those  who  do  not  run  the project.  Let  w  be  the 
wage  rate, which  the  employers  can  pledge  to pay  to  the workers  after 
the project  has  been  completed  and  the output  has  been  sold.  By  running 
a project  in  sector  z  the  entrepreneur  earns  p(z)R,  out  of which  they  pay 
the wage  bill,  w(l 
- 




co).  By  not  run 
ning  the  project  and  supplying  labor,  they  consume  wen.  Hence,  any 




co)  > wco,  and  equivalently, 
p(z)R>w,  (PC-z)(42) 
where  (PC-z)  stands  for  the Profitability  Constraint  for  Sector  z. This  con 
straint  may  not  be  binding,  because  the  employers  can  pledge  only  a 
fraction  of  the project  revenue  for  the wage  payment.  The  employers  in 
sector  z can  pledge  only  X(z)p(z)R,  where  X(z)  is continuous  and  strictly 
increasing  with  the  range  from  zero  to  one.  Because  of  the  partial 
pledgeability,  the projects  in sector  z  take  place  if and  only  if they  satisfy 44  Matsuyama 
X(z)p(z)R  > w(l 
- 
co),  (BC-z)(43) 
where  (BC-z)  stands  for  the  Borrowing  Constraint  for  Sector  z. Note  that 
the  pledgeable  fraction  of  the  project  revenue,  X(z),  is  now  sector 
specific.  The  assumption  that  it  is strictly  increasing  means  that  the  sec 
tors  are  indexed  such  that  the  agency  problems  underlying  the borrow 
ing  constraint  are  bigger  in  lower-indexed  sectors. 
The  Cobb-Douglas  preferences  ensure  that,  in autarky,  the  economy 
produces  in all  the  sectors.  Thus,  both  (PC-z)  and  (BC-z) must  be  satis 
fied  for  all  z. Furthermore,  for  each  z, one  of  them must  be  binding;  oth 
erwise,  no  agent  would  become  workers.  Therefore, 
p(z)/w 
= max{l,  (1 
- 
co)  A(z)}/R.  (44) 
It is decreasing  in X(z)  <  1 -  co  and  constant  for X(z)  >  1 -  co.  Note  that,  for 
X(z)  <  1 - 
co, (BC-z)  is binding  and  p(z)R  > w.  In the  sectors  plagued  by  big 
agency  problems,  each  project  must  earn  higher  revenues  in order  to as 
sure  the workers  for  their wage  payment.  The  higher  prices  and  higher 
project  revenues  in these  sectors  are  due  to  the difficulty  of  obtaining  the 
credit,  which  restricts  the  entry  in  these  sectors.43  To  see  this,  let n(z)  de 
note  the number  of projects  run  in sector  z. Then,  the  total  output  in sec 
tor  z  is n(z)R,  which  must  be  equal  to D(z)  in autarky.  Thus,  E = 
p(z)D(z) 
= 
p(z)n(z)R.  Hence,  (44)becomes 
n(z) = min{l,  X(z)/(1 
- 
co))EM  (45) 
which  is  increasing  in X(z)  <  1 -  co  and  constant  for X(z)  >  1 -  co.  Since  each 
project  requires  one  unit  of  labor,  and  the  aggregate  labor  endowment  is 
equal  to  co, the  resource  constraint  in  this  economy  is given  by 
i 
[ n(z)dz =  co.  (46) 
Summing up  (45) for all z and using  (46)  yields 
min{l,Mz)/(l-co)} 
n(Z) 
\l  min{l, X(s)/(1 
-  co)}ds 
^ (  } 
which  implies  n(z)  <  co for  low  z and  n(z)  >  co for high  z.44 This  restricted 
entry  and  the  resulting  excess  profits  enable  the  incumbent  firms  to  sat 
isfy  their  borrowing  constraints  in  low-indexed  sectors. 
Now,  suppose  that  the world  economy  consists  of  two  countries  of  the 
kind  analyzed  above,  North  and  South.  They  have  identical  parameters 
except  X(z)  and  co. Furthermore,  it  is assumed  that  XN(z) 
= 
XNA(z)  and 
Xs(z) 
= 
XsA(z),  where  A(z)  is  continuous  and  increasing  in  z with  the Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  45 
\  ps(z)/ws 
1  pu{z)lwA  . 
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Figure  1.31 
Patterns  of Absolute  Advantage 
range  from  zero  to one,  and  0 <  A,N, A,s  <  1. This  means  that  the  agency 
problems  underlying  the  borrowing  constraint  have  two  components; 
A(z)  depends  on  the  technologies  and  other  sector-specific  factors,  and 
XN  and  Xs  depend  on  corporate  governance,  legal  enforcement,  and 
other  country-specific  factors  that  determine  the  overall  level  of  finan 
cial  development  in  these  economies.  In what  follows,  let us  assume  (1 
-coN)AN<(l-cos)As. 
From  (44),  the  autarky  prices  in North  and  South,  pN(z)  and  ps(z)  are 
now  given  by 
P/(z)/u;. 
= 
max{l,(l-co;.)A7A(z)}/R  (j 
= 
N,  S).  (48) 
Since  (1 
- 
coN)  AN  <  (1 -cos)  As,  equation  (48)  implies  that  pN(z)/wN 
< 
ps(z)/ws  for  all  z and  pN(z)/wN  < ps(z)/ws  for  z  such  that A(z)  <  (1 
- 
cos)/ 
Xs,  as  shown  in  figure  1.31.  This  means  that  the  credit  market  imperfec 
tions  effectively  become  the  source  of North's  absolute  advantage  over 
South. 
Hence,  when  North  and  South  trade with  each  other,  the  equilibrium 
relative  wage  must  satisfy  wN>ws,  so  that  South  gains  comparative  ad 
vantage  in high  indexed  sectors.  Figure  1.32  shows  the patterns  of  com 
parative  advantage.  North,  whose  credit  market  functions  better  and 
whose  entrepreneurs  are  richer  and  hence  more  credit-worthy,  special 
izes  and  exports  in  the  lower  indexed  sectors  that  suffer  from  bigger 
agency  problems.  South  specializes  and  exports  in higher  indexed  sec 
tors, which  are  subject  to  smaller  agency  problems.  The  relative  wage 
rate  and  the marginal  sector,  A(zc) 
= 
Ac,  are  determined  by  the balanced 
trade  condition.45 46  Matsuyama 
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Figure  1.32 
Patterns  of  Comparative  Advantage 
8  General  Equilibrium  with  Pure  Price 
Effects:  A Model  of  Polarization 
In all  the models  we  have  looked  at  so  far,  credit  market  imperfections 
distort  the  allocation  of  resources.  In  the  following  model,  credit  market 
imperfections  do  not  distort  the  allocation  of  resources,  and  yet,  they 
have  distributional  implications  through  their  effects  of  prices.  The 
model  is clearly  very  special,  but  it helps  to highlight  how  the net worth 
effect  could  operate  through  prices  rather  than  quantities. 
Consider  a continuum  of  agents  with  unit  mass,  whose  input  endow 
ment  in period  0  is distributed  according  to G(co).  In addition  to  lending 
x <  co  units  of  the  input  in period  0  for  rx units  of  consumption  in period 
1, each  agent  now  has  access  to  an  investment  project  with  the  variable 
scale  I>m,  which  converts  I units  of  the  input  into RI units  in consump 
tion  in period  1. To  operate  this  project  at  the  scale  equal  to  I,  the  agent 
needs  to borrow  I -  co  at  the market  rate  equal  to  r.  Here,  m  is  the mini 
mum  investment  requirement,  that  is,  investing  I<m  generates  nothing. 
As  before,  each  agent  maximizes  the period-1  consumption.  By  running 







r)I +  rco. By  lending,  the  agent  can  consume  U  =  rco. Therefore,  if R 
<  r, the  agent  prefers  lending;  if R  =  r, the  agent  is  indifferent;  and  if R  > 
r, the  agent  wants  to borrow  and  invest  as much  as possible. 
However,  the  agent  can  pledge  only  the  fraction  X of  the  project  rev 
enue,  hence  facing  the  following  borrowing  constraint: 
XRI>r(I-a).  (BC)(49) Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  47 
If r < XR,  the  agent  would  borrow  and  invest  by  infinite  amount,  which 
would  never  occur  in  equilibrium.  However,  for  XR<r  <R,  the  agent 
would  borrow  and  invest  up  to  its borrowing  limit,  as  long  as  it also  sat 
isfies  the minimum  investment  requirement,  m.  This  means  that,  for XR 
<r<R,  the  investment  demand  schedule  by  an  agent  with  the  input  en 
dowment,  co, is given  by 
I((d) 
=  1 
- ?  co if  co  > 
coc 
=  m  1 
- ?  , 
and  zero  otherwise.  Therefore,  the  credit  market  equilibrium  is given  by 
F  (  XR\-i  r?? 
Aggregate  Saving 
= 
codG(co) 
=  1 -  ? 
corfG(co)  (50) 
J0 
\ 
r  /  m(l-XR/r) 
= 
Aggregate  Investment 
for XR<r<R.  Figure  1.33  illustrates  this  condition.  The  vertical  line  rep 
resents  the  LHS  of  (50), while  the  downward-sloping  curve  represents 
the RHS  of  (50).  For  a  sufficiently  small  X,  that  is,  if X<  J0m(1-^codG(co)/Jo 
corfG(co), the  vertical  line  intersects  with  the  downward-sloping  part  of 
the  aggregate  investment  schedule,  ensuring  that  XR  <r  < R  holds  in 
equilibrium.  In  this  equilibrium,  the  relatively  rich  become  the  borrow 
ers;  they  borrow  as much  as possible  from  the  relatively  poor,  who  have 
no  choice  but  to  lend  to  the  rich.  In  this model,  what  separates  the  rich 
from  the  poor  is  their  relative  position  in  the wealth  distribution.  They 
do  not  have  to be  rich  by  any  absolute  standard,  because  the  equilibrium 
r 
R  V  (  ART1  r 
\  1-?  I  axlG(a>)  V 
^  r  J  Ml-AR  r) 
XR 
?  ? 
O 
^codG(co) 
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rate  of  return  always  adjusts  to  make  sure  that  some  agents  would  have 
to become  lenders,  while  others  would  become  borrowers. 
Now  suppose  that X is reduced  further.  This  shifts  down  the  aggregate 
investment  schedule.  However,  the  aggregate  investment  does  not 
change,  due  to  the  inelastic  aggregate  saving.  The  overall  effect  is hence 
a  reduction  in  r such  that  XIr  remains  constant,  which  also  means  that 
coc  remains  intact.  Thus,  a  change  in X has  no  effects  on  the  allocation  of 
resources,  as  r  moves  endogenously  to  offset  any  effect  that  X might 
have. 
However,  it  has  distributional  effects,  as  seen  by  calculating  the 
period-1  consumption  for  each  agent  as  follows: 
' 
(\-X)R  I  XR\ 
^r-W7co  ifco>coc^l--j 
U(co)=|  /  XR\  rco  if  co  <  co =  m  1 
I  \  r J 
which  is  illustrated  by  figure  1.34. Note  that  the marginal  return  of hav 
ing  an  additional  unit  of  the  input  differs  across  the  agents.  For  the poor, 
it is equal  to  r,  which  is strictly  lower  than  the project  return,  R,  because 
the  credit  market  imperfection  prevents  the poor  from  borrowing  to  in 





which  is  strictly  higher  than  R,  because  of  the  leverage  effect. That  is,  the 
credit  market  imperfections  enable  them  to borrow  at  the market  rate 
UUo)  1/  \-XRIr 
J  Rco 
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/ 
/  /  rco 
/  * yr 
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strictly  lower  than  the  project  return,  R.  It  is precisely  due  to  the  lever 
age  effect  that makes  the  rich wanting  to borrow  as much  as  possible, 
which  is precisely  the  reason  why  their  (BC)  is binding,  that  is, equation 
(49) holds  with  equality  for  the  rich.  The  arrows  depict  the  effects  of  a 
lower  X,  which  reduces  r. By moving  the  terms  of  trade  against  the poor 
lenders  and  in favor  of  the  rich borrowers,  this  further  magnifies  the dis 
parity  of  the marginal  returns  on wealth  between  the  rich  and  the poor. 
Long-Run  Implications  on Wealth  Distribution 
What  would  happen  to  the wealth  distribution  if we  allow  for  some 
feedback  from  (J(co) to  co?  Following  Banerjee  and  Newman  (1993)  and 
Galor  and  Zeira  (1993),  imagine  that  each  agent  has  an  offspring,  to 
whom  he  leaves  the  bequest,  which  is  an  increasing  function  of  (i(co). 
Since  the  shape  of  IT(co), including  the  threshold  level  of wealth,  coc, is a 
function  of  G(co),  this  determines  the  dynamic  evolution  of wealth  dis 
tribution,  Gt+1(-) 
= 
<E>(G,(-)),  which  can  be  iterated  to  solve  for  the  long 
run wealth  distribution  from  any  initial  distribution.  In  some  cases,  the 
long  run  distribution  converges  to a  single  mass  point,  regardless  of  the 
initial  distribution.  This  occurs  if a  fast wealth  accumulation  by  the  rich 
and  their  strong  investment  demand  drives  up  the  equilibrium  rate  of 
return  so much  that  the poor  lenders  could  also  accumulate  their wealth 
by  lending,  which  helps  them  to cross  over  the  threshold  level  of wealth. 
This  is  the  case  where  the  rich's  wealth  "trickles  down"  to  the  poor 
through  the  credit  market.  In other  cases,  the  long  run  distribution  con 
verges  to a  two-point  distribution,  regardless  of  the  initial  distribution. 
The  credit  market  causes  an  endogenous  polarization  of  the  society  be 
tween  the  rich  and  the  poor.  The  rich maintain  a high  level  of wealth  in 
part  because  of  the  cheap  credit  offered  by  the poor,  who  have  no  choice 
but  to  lend  their  small  saving  to  the  rich.  In  some  other  cases,  the  long 
run  distribution  depends  on  the  initial  distribution,  exhibiting  the  his 
tory  dependence.46 
9  Concluding  Remarks 
Credit  market  imperfections  provide  the key  to understanding  many  im 
portant  issues  in business  cycles,  growth  and  development,  and  interna 
tional  economics.  Recent  progress  in  these  areas,  however,  has  left  in  its 
wake  a bewildering  array  of  individual  models  with  seemingly  conflict 
ing  results.  Using  the  same  single  model  of  credit  market  imperfections 50  Matsuyama 
throughout,  this  paper  brought  together  a diverse  set  of  results  within  a 
unified  framework.  In so doing,  it showed  how  a  wide  range  of  aggregate 
phenomena  may  be  attributed  to  credit  market  imperfections.  They  in 
clude,  among  other  things,  endogenous  investment-specific  technical 
changes,  development  traps,  leapfrogging,  persistent  recessions,  recur 
ring  boom-and-bust  cycles,  reverse  international  capital  flows,  the  rise 
and  fall  of  inequality  across  nations,  and  the  patterns  of  international 
trade.  The  framework  is also  used  to  investigate  some  equilibrium  and 
distributional  impacts  of  improving  the  efficiency  of  credit  markets.  One 
recurring  finding  is that  the properties  of  equilibrium  often  respond  non 
monotonically  to parameter  changes,  which  suggests  some  cautions  for 
studying  aggregate  implications  of  credit  market  imperfections  within  a 
narrow  class  or  a particular  family  of models. 
Although  the  simple  framework  used  in  this  paper  enabled  me  to dis 
cuss many  issues  within  the  limited  space,  it has  some  limitations.  First, 
it  is highly  restrictive  in  the  dynamic  feedback  mechanisms.  For  ex 
ample,  it  rules  out  endogenous  savings  by  the  investing  agents,  and 
hence  the  possibility  that  they may  accumulate  the  net  worth  in antici 
pation  of  their  future  financing  needs,  the  issue  addressed  by  Green 
wood  and  Jovanovic  (1990),  Buera  (2006),  and  others.  The  model  also 
rules  out  the possibility  that  the borrower's  net  worth  might  depend  on 
the  future  allocation  of  credit  through  the  equilibrium  determination  of 
durable  assets  owned  by  the borrowers,  the  issue  addressed  by  Shleifer 
and  Vishny  (1992),  Kiyotaki  and Moore  (1997),  and  Kiyotaki  (1998).  The 
model  also  assumes  that  all  the  projects  are  completed  in one  period. 
This  rules  out  any  issues  associated  with  multistage  financing,  such  as 
project  terminations  and  refinancing,  as  addressed  by  Clementi  and 
Hopenhayn  (2006),  DeMarzo  and  Fishman  (2006),  and  Gertler  (1992). 
More  importantly,  allowing  for  such  multi-period  projects  is essential 
for understanding  the  liquidity  implications  of  credit  market  imperfec 
tions,  as  shown  by Holmstrom  and  Tirole  (1997,1998)  and  Kiyotaki  and 
Moore  (2002,  2005a,  2005b).  Second,  the  pledgeability  X, which  mea 
sures  (inversely)  the  severity  of  agency  problems  behind  the  credit  mar 
ket  imperfections,  has  been  treated  as  exogenous.  To  the  extent  that  it re 
flects  the  state  of  financial  development,  we  would  like  to  introduce 
some  feedback  mechanisms  from  the  investments  to  the  credit  market 
efficiency  in order  to address  the  two-way  causality  between  economic 
growth  and  financial  development,  the  issue  addressed  by  Acemoglu 
and  Zilibotti  (1997),  Greenwood  and  Smith  (1997),  Martin  and  Rey 
(2004),  and  Saint-Paul  (1992).  To  the  extent  that  it reflects  the  quality  of Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  51 
legal  or  contractual  enforcement  and  other  institutional  factors,  we 
would  like  to endogenize  it in order  to address  some  political  economy 
issues.  Finally,  aggregate  implications  of  credit  market  imperfections 
have  been  examined  in  the  otherwise  neoclassical  competitive  frame 
work.  While  this  is useful  for  isolating  the  effects  of  credit  market  im 
perfections,  it  would  be  interesting  to  examine  how  credit  market  im 
perfections  might  interact  with  other  departures  from  the  neoclassical 
framework.  For  example,  introducing  credit  market  imperfections  into 
the monopolistic  competitive  framework,  also  rich  and  diverse  in  its ag 
gregate  implications,  as pointed  out  by Matsuyama  (1995,1997),  would 
be  essential  for  understanding  how  credit  market  imperfections  affect 
the  process  of  product  innovation,  firm  entry  dynamics,  as well  as  ag 
glomeration  economies. 
I  believe  that  incorporating  these  additional  elements  into  the present 
framework  would  only  strengthen  the  basic  message  of  the  paper. 
Credit  market  imperfections  are  rich  and  diverse  in  the  aggregate  im 
plications  and  they  provide  the  key  to understanding  a wide  range  of 
important  issues.  What  has  been  discussed  here  is  merely  the  tip  of  the 
iceberg. 
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Endnotes 
1.  The  existing  surveys  focus  on  a  few  specific  areas  of  applications.  See  Bernanke,  Gertler, 
and  Gilchrist  (1999)  for  business  cycle  propagation  mechanisms;  Banerjee-Duflo  (2005)  in 
development  economics;  Bertola,  Foellmi,  Zweimueller  (2006,  chapter  7)  for  income  dis 52  Matsuyama 
tributions.  Tirole  (2005,  part  VI,  particularly  chapter  13)  is closest  in  spirit  to  this  paper,  but 
it does  not  cover  any  applications  in  international  economics.  Gertler  (1988)  offers  an  in 
teresting  glimpse  on  the  state  of  the  field  before  it became  a  major  research  topic. 
2.  Credit  market  imperfections  could  also  cause  endogenous  fluctuations  of  TFP  to  the  ex 
tent  they  affect  financing  of working  capital.  I have  chosen  to  focus  on  investment-specific 
technical  change  because  of  some  recent  studies  suggesting  that  investment-specific  tech 
nical  changes  perform  better  than  the  traditional,  neutral  (TFP)  technical  changes;  see 
Greenwood,  Hercowitz,  Krusell  (1997,2000),  and  Fisher  (2006). 
3.  In my  view,  anyone  who  believes  in  the  credit  market  imperfections,  at  least  seriously 
enough  to do  research  in  this  area,  should  never  examine  the  impacts  of  any  policy  under 
the  assumption  that  such  a policy  could  eradicate  the  imperfections.  The  most  one  could 
hope  for  in any  policy  is  to  improve  the  credit  market. 
4.  Those  who  prefer  the  language  of  agency  theory  may  want  to  refer  to  the  Profitability 
Constraint  as  the  Borrower's  Incentive  Compatibility  (or Participation)  Constraint  and  to 
the  Borrowing  Constraint  as  the  Lenders'  Incentive  Compatibility  Constraint  (or  Partici 
pation)  Constraint. 
5.  Some  authors  call  the  inequality  analogous  to  co  >  1 - 
XR/r  "the  collateral  constraint/' 
while  other  authors  call  it  "the  cash  flow  constraint/'  or  "the  liquidity  constraint."  In do 
ing  so,  they  assume  that  the  borrower's  net  worth  held  only  in  collateralizable  assets  or 
only  in  liquid  assets  could  be  used  to  satisfy  the  constraint.  I deliberately  avoid  the  use  of 
the  terms  "collateral"  or  "liquidity"  because  I am  primarily  concerned  with  the  question 
of  how  the  borrowing  constraint  is affected  by  the  (level  of)  borrower  net  worth,  abstract 
ing  from  the  role  of  the  borrower's  portfolio  or  liquidity  holdings.  Needless  to  say,  this  is 
an  important  issue,  but  its  careful  treatment  would  require  a  much  richer  framework  than 
the  one  used  in  this  paper. 
6.  See,  for  example,  Tirole  (2005;  chapter  3,  supplementary  sections). 
7.  Broadly  speaking,  there  are  three  reasons  for  this.  First,  the major  causes  of  credit  mar 
ket  imperfections,  even  if  we  could  identify  them  in certain  specific  cases,  are  likely  to vary 
across  investment  types,  industries,  countries,  and  times.  Second,  at  least  qualitatively 
speaking,  much  of  the  aggregate  and  equilibrium  implications  of  credit  market  imperfec 
tions  do  not  depend  on  the  specific  nature  of  the  agency  problems  behind  the  imperfec 
tions.  The  last,  and  perhaps  the most  important,  reason  is  a practical  one.  This  reduced 
form  approach  saves  space,  as well  as  the  time  and  effort  of  the  reader.  For  example,  this 
approach  enables  me  to  reproduce  the  key  results  of  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1989)  and  of 
Boyd  and  Smith  (1997),  each  of which  devoted  many  pages  and  appendices  to  explain  the 
optimal  contract  problem  under  costly  state  verification.  In  contrast,  I needed  only  one 
short  paragraph  to describe  the  borrowing  constraint. 
8.  See  Tirole  (2005,  p.  119) who  also  argues  for  the  benefits  of  separating  the  general  issues 
of  credit  market  imperfections  from  the  questions  of  the  financial  structure. 
9.  The  owners  of  the  "hidden  factors"  play  no  active  role  in  the  economy  other  than  sup 
plying  these  factors  inelastically  and  absorbing  the  residual  income.  The  hidden  factors 
are  introduced  here  merely  to  generate  diminishing  returns  to  capital.  Later,  these  "hid 
den  factors"  in  fixed  supply  will  be  given  an  additional  role when  this model  is embedded 
in  a dynamic  setting  to endogenize  the  borrower  net  worth. 
10.  One  may  think  that  the  agents  have  access  to  a  storage  technology  of  return,  r.  Alter 
natively,  this may  be  viewed  as  a  model  of  a  small  open  economy  or  of  an  industry. Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  53 
11.  Equation  (5)  implicitly  assumes  the  interior  solution,  which  can  be  ensured  by  impos 
ing that  Rf  (R)  < r.  Then,  (5)  holds with  0 < k < R,  which  implies that 0 < n < 1. 
12.  For  example,  imagine  the  following  sequential  service  constraint:  the  market  ap 
proves  n  credits  on  the  first-come,  first-serve  basis,  and  those  agents  whose  credit  appli 
cations  are  delayed  (for  some  random  reasons)  will  be  denied. 
13.  A  change  in  r  would  have  more  complicated  welfare  effects,  but  its  effects  on  k and  coc 
are  straightforward:  a  rise  in  r leads  to a decline  in k by  raising  coc.  This  is  roughly  consis 
tent with  the  evidence  found  by  Gertler  and  Gilchrist  (1994)  and  others  that  small  manu 
facturing  firms  are more  sensitive  to  the  tightening  of monetary  policy. 
14.  Aghion,  Fally,  and  Scarpetta  (2007)  shows  some  evidence  that,  after  a  financial  liber 
alization,  the  entry  of  small  firms  force  larger  firms  to  scale  down  or  to  exit  completely. 
15.  The  partial  equilibrium  model  of  the previous  section  may  be  viewed  as  a  special  case, 
where  the  saver's  preferences  are  given  by  U?  = 
pC?  +  C?,  so  that  the  aggregate  saving  is 
infinitely  elastic.  One  may  also  analyze  the  case  without  the  savers  by  looking  at  the  spe 
cial  case  where  the  aggregate  saving  is  inelastic  at  S(r) 
=  co. 
16.  For  example,  consider  the  case  without  the  savers,  so  that  the  total  saving  is  equal  to 
co. Then,  k =  Rco  and  from  (5),  r = 
XRf  (Rco)/(l 
- 
co). Simple  algebra  can  show  that  this  is 
increasing  in  co in  the  range,  t\/(1  +  r\)  <  co  <  1 - 
X,  where  t\ 
=  - 
log(/'  )/log(/c) 
= 
-kf'/f  is 
the  elasticity  of  the marginal  productivity  of  capital. 
17.  Here,  the  effects  of  exogenous  changes  in  co  and  co? (as well  as  X) on  k are  studied.  What 
if  we  also  allow  for  some  feedback  from  k to  co and  co?? Imagine  that  the  entrepreneur's  net 
worth  and  the  saver's  net  worth  in period  t, co, and  co?, jointly  determined  kt+1,  as  described 
above,  which  in  turn  determines  that  co,+1 
= 
W(kt+1)  and  co?+1 
= 
W?(kt+1).  (This  can  be  jus 
tified,  for  example,  by  embedding  our  two-period  agents  into  the  overlapping  agents 
framework,  as  discussed  later.)  The  dynamics  of  this  economy  then  depends  on  how  a 
change  in k affects  the  distribution  of  the wealth  between  the  entrepreneurs  and  the  savers. 
Aghion,  Banerjee,  and  Piketty  (1999)  conducted  analysis  along  this  line  in a  similar  setting, 
and  found  the  case  of  endogenous  cycles,  where  periods  of  low  investment,  during  which 
the wealth  distribution  is  shifted  towards  the  savers,  alternate  with  periods  of  high  in 
vestment,  during  which  the wealth  distribution  is  shifted  toward  the  entrepreneurs. 
18.  One  could  remove  this  feature  by  letting  the  endowment  be  distributed  according  to 
G(co)  and  by  studying  the  effects  of  shifts  in G(co).  The  analysis  here  may  be  viewed  as  the 
limit  case  where  G(co)  converges  to  a  single  mass. 
19.  One  may  call  this  effect  "flight  to  safety"  (as opposed  to  "flight  to quality"),  following 
Barlevy  (2003),  who  also  developed  a  model  in  which  the  credit  composition  shifts  toward 
lower  productivity  projects  during  recessions. 




X^/RJ  <  1. 
21.  This  conversion  to  the  dynamic  framework  is  simple  in part  because  the  "hidden  fac 
tors"  do  not  include  durable  assets,  such  as  the  land.  Otherwise,  the  borrower  net  worth 
in period  t  would  depend  on  the  asset  prices  in period  t,  which  depends  on  the  future  tra 
jectory  of  the  economy,  which  in  turn  depends  on  the  investment  and  the  borrower's  net 
worth  in period  t. Kiyotaki  and  Moore  (1997)  and  Kiyotaki  (1998)  argued  that  such  asset 
price  movements  make  amplification  quantitatively  significant.  This  conjecture  has  been 
studied  by  Kocherlakota  (2000),  Krishnamurthy  (2003),  Cooley,  Marimon,  and  Quadrini 
(2004),  and  Cordoba  and  Ripoll  (2004). 54  Matsuyama 
22.  The  space  constraint  prevents  me  from  discussing  many  broad  methodological  issues 
associated  with  poverty  trap models;  see Azariadis  and  Stachurski  (2005)  and Matsuyama 
(2005b)  on  these  issues. 
23.  Mathematically,  for  any  e >  0,  there  exist  open  intervals,  I* and  I** c  (0,  e),  such  that, 
as  t  ?>  oo, kt  ?>  k*  for  k0 e  I* and  kt  ?>  k**  for  k0 e  I**. 
24.  For  example,  imagine  that  only  type-1  projects,  textile  and  other  industries  that 
emerged  at  the  time  of  the  first  industrial  revolution  are  available  initially,  and  some  coun 
tries,  say  Britain,  have  succeeded  in  reaching  the  steady  state,  k*. Then,  the  second  indus 
trial  revolution  arrives  and  type-2  projects,  including  some  new  technologies  like  chemi 
cal  and  steel  industries,  are  born.  Britain,  located  in  k*,  is  unable  to  switch  to  the  new 
technologies,  while  some,  but  not  all,  latecomers,  say  Germany,  come  from  behind  and 
take  over  the  technology  leadership  by  successfully  adopting  the  new  technologies. 
25.  Although  these  figures  depict  period-2  cycles,  the  fluctuations  can  take  a more  com 
plicated  form. 
26  As  shown  in  all  these  figures,  the  graph  intersects  with  the  45?  degree  line  no  more 
than  twice.  This  can  be  proved  in  the  same  way  as  the  proof  in  Matsuyama  (2004,  p.  865; 
lemma). 
27.  This  and  the  next  cases  are  based  on Matsuyama  (2004b). 
28.  Aghion,  Banerjee,  and  Piketty  (1999)  also  showed  that  endogenous  cycles  occur  when 
the  parameter  representing  the  degree  of  credit  market  imperfection  has  an  intermediate 
value.  They  interpreted  it as  saying  that  countries  at  an  intermediate  level  of  financial  de 
velopment  are  subject  to volatility.  This  may  be  an  appropriate  interpretation  in  the  con 
text  of  their model,  but  not  here.  Recall  that we  are  looking  at  situations  where  the  agents 
have  access  to many  investment  opportunities  and  face  no  borrowing  constraint  when  fi 
nancing  the  capital-generating  projects,  and  seeing  what  might  happen  when  we  change 
the  imperfections  that  affect  the  financing  of  alternative  projects,  which  could  divert  the 
credit  flow  away  from  the  capital-producing  projects.  One  could  argue  that  a better  credit 
market  might  be more  prone  to  financing  such  alternative  projects,  thereby  diverting  the 
credit  flow  away. 
29.  For  the  empirical  evidence  for  the  business  cycle  asymmetry,  see,  for  example,  Falk 
(1986),  Sichel  (1993),  and  Acemoglu  and  Scott  (1997). 
30.  Another  context  in which  this  problem  arises  naturally  is  the  case  where  different 
agents  have  expertise  in different  industries  and/or  technologies  and  capital  are  highly 
specialized  in a  specific  industry  or  technology. 
31.  Or,  the  entrepreneur's  productivity,  R,  declines  substantially  when  operating  abroad. 
This  assumption  effectively  rules  out  the  foreign  direct  investment.  Later,  some  implica 
tions  of  relaxing  this  assumption  will  be  discussed. 
32.  Prasad,  Rajan,  and  Subramanian  (2006)  and  Kose,  Prasad,  Rogoff,  and Wei  (forthcom 
ing)  offer  overviews  of  the  empirical  patterns.  The  model  here  extends  Matsuyama  (2005a, 
section  2)  by  adding  the  savers. 
33.  Of  course,  a priori,  there  is no  reason  to believe  that  the  effect  is  monotone  in  cp, so  that 
the  following  results  should  be  interpreted  with  great  caution.  However,  dealing  with  the 
intermediate  cases  would  substantially  complicate  the  analysis,  as  one  would  have  to  take 
into  account  two  separate  borrowing  constraints,  one  for  the  domestic  and  one  for  the  in Aggregate  Implications  of Credit Market  Imperfections  55 
ternational  borrowings.  Caballero  and  Krishnamurthy  (2001)  and  Aoki,  Benigno,  and 
Kiyotaki  (2006)  both  studied  this  issue  in  small  open  economy  models. 
34.  It is assumed  here  that  the  two  countries  are  of  the  equal  size  to  minimize  the notation, 
even  though  allowing  for  different  country  sizes  is  straightforward. 
35.  Again,  for  the  case  without  the  saver,  rN  >  rs if r\/{l  +  vi)<(Ds<(0N<l-XN 
= 
l-Xs.  See 
Matsuyama  (2005a,  section  2). 
36.  In  their  moral  hazard  model,  Gertler  and  Rogoff  (1990)  demonstrated  that  capital 
flows  from  the  rich  to  the  poor  is  muted  in  the  imperfect  information  case,  compared  to  the 
perfect  information  case.  It  is not  clear  whether  the  reverse  capital  flows  occur  in  their 
model,  unless  the  net  worth  of  the  poor  is negative.  In  the  present  model,  the  reverse  cap 
ital  flows  occurs  even  if  the  net  worth  of  the  Southern  entrepreneurs  is  slightly  less  than 
that  of  the Northern  entrepreneurs. 
37.  See  Ju and Wei  (2006,2007)  for  some  related  analysis  of  the  two-way  flows  of  FDI  and 
the  lending.  Similar  mechanisms  might  be  at work  at  regional  levels  within  a  country.  Sav 
ings  in  rural  areas,  instead  of  financing  the  local  businesses,  may  flow  into  big  city  finan 
cial  centers,  which  finance  the  investment  into  the  rural  areas  by  big  businesses  whose 
headquarters  are  located  in  metropolitan  areas. 
38.  Lucas  (1990),  for  example,  argued  that  human  capital  externalities  might  be  the  reason 
why  the  saving  does  not  flow  from  the North  to  the  South. 
39.  Sakuragawa  and  Hamada  (2001)  studied  the  case  where  only  one  country  (South)  suf 
fers  from  the  credit  market  imperfections  in  a  similar  model. 
40.  The  intellectual  origin  of  this  view  can  be  traced  back  to  the  structuralism  of Nurske 
(1953),  Myrdal  (1957), and Lewis  (1977). 
41.  Incidentally,  Boyd  and  Smith  (1997)  obtained  the  exactly  same  dynamics,  (38)-(39),  in 
their  two-country  model  of  the  credit  market  imperfection  based  on  the  costly  state  verifi 
cation  problem.  They  found  numerical  examples  with  one  unstable  symmetry  steady  state 
and  two  stable  asymmetric  steady  states.  See  also  Kikuchi  (2006),  who  considered  the  case 
of  two  countries  with  unequal  population  sizes.  His  simulation  shows  that,  if  the  country 
sizes  are  similar,  the  asymmetric  steady  states  are  stable.  However,  he  also  found  endoge 
nous  fluctuations  around  the  asymmetric  steady  states,  when  the  countries  sizes  are  suffi 
ciently  different. 
42.  Matsuyama  (2005c)  discusses  the  notion  of  symmetry-breaking  and  its applications  to 
economics. 
43.  This  means  that  the  entrepreneurs  are  not  indifferent  between  the  sectors.  They  prefer 
running  the  project  in  lower-indexed  sectors.  See  Remark  3  for  how  to  allocate  the  credit 
when  the  agents  are  not  indifferent. 
44.  Note  that  the  binding  borrowing  constraints  in  low-indexed  sectors  give  rise  to posi 
tive  profits.  The  total  profit  in  sector  z  is equal  to E  - 
wn(z),  which  is positive  for  X(z)  <  1 - 
co and  zero  for  X(z)  >  1 -  co. Summing  it up  across  all  the  sectors  and  using  (46)  verifies  that 
the  aggregate  profit  n  is given  by  n  =  E  -  wco.  Hence,  the  aggregate  income  Y  satisfies  Y 
=  wco  +  n  =  e. 
45.  This  section  is  taken  from  Matsuyama  (2005a,  section  3).  Earlier  studies  that  looked  at 
credit-based  explanations  of  the  patterns  of  trade  include  Kletzer  and  Bardhan  (1987)  and 56  Matsuyama 
Beck  (2002).  See Manova  (2006a,  2006b)  and Wynne  (2005)  for more  recent  examples.  This 
is  a part  of  the  growing  literature  that  seeks  the  institutional  origins  of  comparative  ad 
vantage,  such  as  Acemoglu,  Antras,  and  Helpman  (forthcoming),  Costinot  (2006), 
Levchenko  (forthcoming),  Nunn  (forthcoming),  and  Vogel  (forthcoming). 
46.  In essence,  this  is  what  is shown  by Matsuyama  (2000).  The  literature  on  the  evolution 
of  household  wealth  distributions  under  credit  market  imperfections  is vast.  In  addition 
to  the  three  studies  already  mentioned,  see  Aghion  and  Bolton  (1997),  Freeman  (1996), 
Matsuyama  (2006),  Mookherjee  and  Ray  (2002),  and  Piketty  (1997).  Just  as  in  the macro  dy 
namics,  the  implications  of  the  credit  market  imperfections  on  the  long  run wealth  distri 
bution  depend  sensitively  on  the  assumptions  about  the way  different  households  inter 
act with  each  other,  which  cannot  be  explained  here  due  to  the  space  constraint.  A  proper 
exposition  of  this  literature  would  require  a whole  new  paper. 
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